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Abstract
This thesis explores a strategic investment motive for the choice of skilled
labour (management). Using the case study of department store compe-
tition, we argue that management is an observable and irreversible input.
This allows firms to use it to obtain a first-mover advantage in oligopolistic
interactions. We find that, given complementarities of labour inputs, firms
will hire excess management relative to the cost-minimising input bundle.
This idea is first illustrated with a simple two-stage example. We then
show that over-management also holds in a more realistic setting with
infinitely-lived firms facing finite adjustment costs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The question of how firm’s choose their labour input has been widely dis-
cussed in the social sciences. Labour has a special role among all inputs.
Some of the primary ways it differs from other inputs are:
1. The person who sells the input is the input.
2. It is one of the few inputs used in all forms of production
3. The differentiability of the labour input is remarkable with each per-
son providing different levels of effort, intrinsic skill, and knowledge
to the productive process.
4. It is the input that most of society uses to gain income and create
wealth.
As a result, a full understanding of the functioning of the labour input is
an essential part of any attempt to understand the functioning of society
as a whole.
The goal of this thesis is to determine whether the labour input of a firm
could in fact be determined through a game of strategic commitment using
different types of labour inputs. This is a situation where the combination
of labour types could be manipulated to convey some type of strategic
advantage to the firm.
We will illustrate the potential for strategic commitment using a specific
case study, department store competition. In this case firms are assumed
1
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to choose two types of inputs, a committable input (management) and a
non-committable input (workers). By illustrating that firms may over-hire
managers relative to the cost minimising choice for a given level of output
we can show that the idea of strategic commitment could explain such a
situation.
The case where firms over-hire managers will be called over-management.
By describing over-management this thesis will add several things to the
literature:
1. A clear framework for viewing the interaction of skilled and un-
skilled labour,
2. A novel description of the labour input, through the strategic inter-
action of types of labour,
3. A description of why firms may rationally overuse skilled labour
relative to the efficient allocation,
4. An illustrative example of when a rational, profit maximising firm
may not choose their set of inputs in a way that minimises costs.
This would show that the duality of cost minimisation and profit
maximisation does not necessarily hold among labour types,
5. A testable hypothesis on the behaviour of the labour input.
The testable hypothesis will be: is there over-management in the department
store industry1. Over-management refers to a situation where the ratio of
managers to other inputs is greater than the static cost minimisation would
suggest. Although not easily quantifiable2, over-management is a phe-
nomena that seems intuitively appealing. Such a phenomena provides a
strong test case for using strategic investment models in terms of labour.
The aim of the following sections is to provide an explanation of over-
management, and therefore provide a test case for the the possibility of
a strategic investment motive among labour inputs. Chapter 2 describes
the elements of the firm required for economic description. Chapter 3 pro-
vides a two-stage strategic investment model that leads to over-management.
1We were unable to find data with which to test this hypothesis. A suggestion of
potential ways to test it is available in Appendix C
2An issue that is briefly touched upon in Appendix C
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Chapter 4 describes problems with the two-stage model. Chapter 5 pro-
vides a dynamic model of strategic investment to explain over-management




For strategic investment to be effective, it must both influence the choices
of the firm’s competitors and be credibly committed to a given level. The
combination of interdependence (Watson 2002) of firms’ actions and com-
mitment provides producers with an incentive to choose investment strate-
gically in order to gain a competitive advantage. The objective of this
chapter is to argue that management can be viewed as a strategic invest-
ment resource. This will allow us to use common economic models of
sequential choice to explain over-management.
Before discussing the nature of management, we need to provide a de-
scription of the setting where management operates. For this purpose, we
must specify the individual elements of this setting, including managers.
An environment that includes multiple firms is referred to as a social situ-
ation. To model such situations, we use the methodology of game theory.
Within the field of game theory, we will focus on a narrower range of
models that answer the question, what will be accepted by a rational agent
(Greenberg 1990)? Economic agents can be firms or individuals. The ob-
jective of a rational agent is to maximise their utility. The questions of what
gives an agent utility and how to measure it may never be clearly an-
swered. However, when analysing the decision making process of firms,
we often assume that utility maximisation corresponds to profit maximi-
sation.
For a firm’s investment to influence the choice of other firms, it must in-
fluence their profits. We will discuss the mechanism of these interactions
4
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over the course of this chapter.
2.1 Assumptions Primer
To clearly describe strategic investment, we must state the assumptions
that underlie our model. They define the boundaries of what this model
explains and pin down the domain of what constitutes a firm. The more
rigid the assumptions required for our result, the fewer situations they
will be applicable to. Conversely, the larger the domain, the more likely
it is that our result will reflect reality (Hamminga 1982). Consequently,
the goal of our modeling approach is to expand this domain as much as
possible. To enlarge the domain of our model, we need to use the least
rigid assumptions that deliver our result. Therefore, when modeling a
situation, it is important to recognise which assumptions are central to
our results.
Maki (1994) discusses the different types of assumptions within a model.
He divides them into two categories: core assumptions and peripheral as-
sumptions. The core assumptions represent the central forces that drive the
results of the model. They are crucial for the analysis. Peripheral assump-
tions are intended to simplify the working of our model by neutralis(ing)
factors that are not regarded as central or essential (Maki 1994). In order to
evaluate a model, it is important to investigate which are the core assump-
tions, and then defend them. The stronger our defense, the more plausible
our hypothesis is.1
According to Maki, the realism of the peripheral assumptions is not neces-
sarily important, as they are not the causal factors of a given phenomenon.
Examples of such assumptions in the literature include homogenous goods
and deterministic demand.2
Given the separate treatment that core and peripheral assumptions re-
ceive, it is essential to be able to clearly differentiate between them. This
is the aim of the following discussion of elements of the model.
1A difficulty we run into is the fact that what constitutes our core assumptions is
often subjective. Thus, it is important to be able to justify our definition of the set core
assumptions.
2Although these specific assumptions are not always peripheral to the results.
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2.2 Elements of the Model
When modeling a social situation, it is important to understand what real-
world phenomenon the model attempts to explain. Describing firm com-
petition will require the specification of all relevant elements. However,
we will focus on the assumptions of the game that may be contentious.
These assumptions are related to three of the elements of the environment:
employees/inputs, the industry, and the decision process of the firm. They
are captured by the following questions.
Employees and inputs
• What are managers and workers?
• How does the production process involving managers and workers
function?
Firm Decision Process
• What sort of horizon is applicable to firm decision making: static,
two-period, or infinite horizon?
Industry
• Do firms operate in an oligopolistic market or engage in monopolis-
tic competition?
• How are the firms’ choice variables related to the industry structure?
2.3 Employees as Inputs
Like land and capital, labour is a factor of production. However there is
a tendency to treat the labour input differently. The reason is that, unlike
other production factors, workers and managers can make conscious de-
cisions. For example, a person decides how hard to work, while a piece
of machinery does not. The employees’ choice of work effort affects the
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productivity of the labour input, which creates a clear distinction between
the behaviour of labour and non-labour inputs.
Because of this fundamental difference, the literature has used different
methods to analyse labour. Sometimes the interaction between labour and
non-labour inputs is treated in a mechanical fashion, as a black box process
leading from a set of inputs to a set of outputs. However, there is also lit-
erature that performs a detailed analysis of the labour input by itself. The
focus on the cognitive dimension associated with labour has led to variety
of game theoretic models that try to explain how this input is incorpo-
rated in the production process. An example of this type of modeling is
efficiency wages (Shapiro & Stiglitz 1984).
In addition to the cognitive element of the labour input, there is also sub-
stantial research on the differentiation within labour. All employees ul-
timately have very different skills and roles. Because of these hetero-
geneities, the labour input can be decomposed into labour types.
Along these lines, one simplistic approach is to divide the labour input
into skilled and unskilled categories (Keren & Levhari 1983). Although
this decomposition is rather simple to be realistic, we will make use of it
in this thesis. Furthermore, the distinction between skilled and unskilled
labour fits the description put forward by the New Zealand Department
of Labour, namely:
“Highly skilled” includes managers and professionals; “skilled”
includes technicians/semi-professionals and trades; and “semi-
skilled/elementary” includes all other occupations.3
This suggests that such a decomposition may be policy relevant. In the
thesis we will use similar classification, distinguishing between managers
(as skilled labour) and workers (as unskilled labour). Another source
of heterogeneity stems from the difference between specific and general
skills. The roles employees take on depend on the industry, as does the
specificity of the skills required for these roles. Finally, the specificity and
the cost of a given skill set are themselves important elements of the de-
scription of labour inputs.
3http://dol.govt.nz/publications/lmr/lmr-Skills.asp
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2.3.1 What type of inputs are managers and workers?
In order to describe managerial and worker inputs, we have to establish
their characteristics. This necessitates an investigation of the role of these
inputs in the production process.
In many situations it is unclear whether managers are more skilled and
have more rigid contracts relative to workers. To get past this issue, we
will focus on the labour inputs of a department store, which seem to ex-
hibit these properties.
Once we analyse the basic model, we will attempt to generalise our results.
This will give us the attributes of the manager/worker relationship that
are necessary for over-management.
2.3.2 Managers
The branch level manager
The issue of what constitutes management is an important question in
social sciences. In economics, managers are often assumed to maximise
their own utility in an environment fraught with principal-agent conflicts.
However, in management science, the strategic management approach de-
picts managers as players whose incentives are aligned to profit maximi-
sation, but have to make decisions in an uncertain environment. In both
disciplines, managers are seen as active players who make strategic deci-
sions within the structure of a firm.
The active, and extremely broad, description of managers that is com-
monly accepted in economics is typified by this quote from Fershtman
& Kalai (1993):
Managing corporations is a complex and time consuming task.
Managers need to evaluate changing market conditions, con-
template competitive strategies, decide on new products, pro-
duction technologies, and new markets, and so forth.
Although this view correctly describes high level management in a large
organisation, it does not seem realistic for managers at lower levels. At
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different steps in the hierarchy of the firm, staff are given separate, spe-
cialised tasks. The focus of this thesis is primarily on the branch level of
firms with a large hierarchical structure.
At the branch level, managers would not be making decisions about tech-
nology or new products/markets, but would react to changes in the mar-
ket conditions and determine hiring levels. Even these tasks of branch
level managers would be constrained by decisions further up the chain of
command, such as the hiring budget.
Ultimately, the managerial input considered here has a more specific role
than the manager described by Fershtman & Kalai (1993). The scope of
this specificity, and how it fits into the production process, are important
properties of the managerial input.
Strategic delegation
Before putting forward assumptions about the specific role of branch level
managers, it is important to mention another area of research known as
strategic delegation (Skilivas 1987) (Fershtman & Judd 1987). In this liter-
ature, the owner of the firm delegates decision-making to a manager, and
then designs a contract that allows him to use management strategically
by setting up appropriate incentives.
The strategic delegation literature does look at a form of commitment, but it
is fundamentally different from the type of commitment considered here.
The difference is that strategic delegation works by influencing the actions
of managers, while in our model commitment is based on the number of
employed managers.
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES 10
The role of branch level managers
In the aforementioned literature, there is implicitly some type of principal-
agent conflict between the owner of the firm and its manager. Assuming
that their relationship can be framed by a principal agent problem, and ab-
stracting from other production factors, we argue that the owner’s choice
of managers and managerial contracts must affect the firm’s level of pro-
duction. Since agents are rational, we know that the contractual relation-
ship between the owner and the mangers at each layer of the firm will be
optimal. When we model the firm’s choice of managerial input, we will
circumvent these issues by assuming that managerial contracts and wage
rates are fixed exogenously.
As we have abstracted from the higher layers of management, our interest
now lies with the relationship between the branch level managers and the
workers. We assume that the primary role of managers is supervision of work-
ers. A similar assumption was also made by Alchian & Demsetz (1972),
who studied production in a firm where workers can shirk. This assump-
tion presupposes that a major role of management is to supervise workers,
thus increasing their productivity.
To provide empirical support for over-management, we will focus on de-
partment store competition in New Zealand. One major New Zealand
department store that has grown substantially over the past decade is the
Warehouse. When advertising for the position of assistant manager, they
identified the following skills as appropriate:
“The key attributes we are looking for are:4
• Previous experience in leading a large team within a retail environ-
ment.
• Individuals who can understand, and have the ability to communi-
cate and model the visions and values of The Warehouse Ltd.
• An ability to build and maintains positive working relationships with
other areas of the business.
• The ability to maintain and enhance the current store environment.
4http://www.thewarehouse.co.nz/content.aspx?id = 100020744#AssStoMan, 4th of
October 2006
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• An ability to communicate at all levels through written and verbal
communication.
• An ability to achieve operational goals.
• The ability to demonstrate superior management competencies.”
Other department stores in New Zealand (Farmers5 and Briscoes6) define
the role of managers in a similar way.
From the above description it is clear that the ability to communicate with
staff is a highly valued skill for managers in the retail industry. The im-
portance of communication over administrative skills implies that super-
vision, and other attributes that increase the marginal product of workers
(such as motivation), are the primary skills required from branch level
managers.
Specificity and supervision
The managerial task of supervision requires specific skills. Although some
people may be naturally disposed to being supervisors, firms usually spend
a large amount of time and money training their staff to supervise. This
investment in human capital makes managers inherently costly to replace.
Furthermore, managers sign full time contracts. Given New Zealand labour
laws, this makes them even costlier to remove.
Costly replacement and removal of managers relates to the difficulty of
changing the extensive margin of the managerial resource. The extensive
margin is the discrete choice of an aggregate variable. In the context of
this thesis, it refers to the choice of the number of managers (and not the
number of manager hours). The difficulty of changing the extensive mar-
gin implies that the number of managers may be costly or impossible to
adjust in the short run.
Similarly, the intensive margin is defined as the continuous choice of an
aggregate variable. In this context, it corresponds to the choice of managerial
hours. The difficulty associated with changing the hours each manager
works implies that it is costly or impossible to adjust in the short run.
5http://www.farmers.co.nz/careers-storeroles.html, October 2006
6http://www.briscoes.co.nz/frames.asp?cont=careers, March 2008
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Most managers receive a fixed salary that does not depend on the hours
worked. As a result, they have no incentive to increase their hours of work.
Also, they are heavily supervised from above, so they are unable to work
less. This rigidity in the hours of work implies further stickiness in the
intensive margin.
Finally, our models will assume a perfectly competitive managerial labour
market. That is, the other firms’ choice of management does not affect the
cost of this resource. This simplification is made in order to eliminate other
mechanisms that would generate over-management.7
Conclusion
The important assumptions about managers can be summarised as fol-
lows:
• Their main role is supervision and motivation of staff.
• The number of managers is costly to adjust.
• The number of manager hours is costly to adjust.
• The labour market for managers is perfectly competitive.
We can therefore define the manager input as follows.
Managerial Input: the number of effective manager hours used
during a period of production.
2.3.3 Workers
The worker input in our model is similar to what is commonly considered
in the general economic literature. Workers provide the final step in the
production process before the good is sold to consumers. In terms of retail
stores, this is the staff who process transactions of goods to consumers (e.g.
checkout staff).
7E.g. through a pecuniary externality on the other firms’ costs.
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Staff at this level of the firm can be skilled or unskilled. Our interest lies
with workers who are unskilled. In other words, the firm has not previ-
ously invested in increasing their productivity.8 Thus, it is relatively inex-
pensive to replace them. Replacement is made even easier by the fact that
many workers in a department store are on part time or casual contracts.
The low cost of replacing and removing workers implies that the extensive
margin (i.e. the number of workers) is relatively adjustable.
Furthermore, unskilled workers are often paid an hourly wage, and their
hours are partially determined by weekly rosters. This implies that their
number of work hours can be adjusted by the firm. As a result, the inten-
sive margin of the worker input is not fixed.
Finally, we assume a perfectly competitive worker labour market. That is,
the other firms’ choice of workers does not affect the cost of this input.
Definition of the worker input
The important assumptions about workers are:
• They sell the retail product to consumers
• The number of workers is relatively costless to adjust
• Work hours are relatively costless to adjust
• The labour market for workers is perfectly competitive.
Therefore, we give the following definition of worker input.
Worker Input: the number of effective worker hours during a
period of production.
2.3.4 How does the production process involving managers
and workers function?
Even though managers and workers are assumed to be separate inputs,
they influence each other in the production process. Papers by Alchian
8To be precise, this does not imply that they have no ability.
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& Demsetz (1972) and Holmstrom (1982) have established that the inter-
action between managers and workers can take the form of a principal-
agent relationship, where production is the result of team work. In this
literature, there is a principal whose interests are aligned with those of the
firm, and an agent whose interests may not be aligned, but whose action
affects profits.
In our model, we could view the set of managers as principals, and the
set of workers as agents. The workers are required to produce a good,
but they dislike exerting the effort that is required for production. The
principal/manager supervises the workers, and punishes them if they are
caught exerting less than the required effort. Such supervision motivates
workers to work harder. This is akin to the efficiency wage solution to the
principal-agent problem, where market wages reflect an “expected cost”
of the choice to shirk.
In models of efficiency wages, each combination of managers and work-
ers determines a level of output, but it does so through a principal-agent
interaction. The relationship between the labour inputs and output can
also be described by a production function, in the same way as with other
inputs.
Managerial incentives
One problem with our approach is the assumption that managerial incen-
tives are aligned with those of the firm. There could be another principal-
agent conflict between low-level managers and managers that are higher
up the firm. In some sense, there are principal-agent conflicts within every
step vertically up the hierarchy. This occurs because the utility maximis-
ing choice of an individual employee is never perfectly aligned with the
owner’s objective.
Papers by Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Holstrom & Milgrom (1991) de-
scribe how principal-agent conflicts can be at least partially solved through
the use of incentive contracts that tie managerial rewards to effort. This
idea is fundamentally different from the supervision problem. While ef-
ficiency wages rely on supervision and punishment, incentive contracts
provide motivation by offering wages that depend on variables correlated
with the agent’s effort. Incentive contracts are often given to high level
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managers, but are virtually absent from the branch level of many firms
(Calvo & Wellisz 1979). This suggests that some other mechanism forces
branch level managers to exert effort.
The literature on the hierarchy of the firm (Williamson (1967), Alchian &
Demsetz (1972)) supports our claim. Calvo & Wellisz (1978) and Calvo
& Wellisz (1979) argue that incentive contracts are more important for
higher-level managers. Fundamentally, the further up the hierarchy of
the firm the employee is, the greater the impact of their effort on total pro-
duction. This is because they are able to influence the marginal product of
a greater number of employees.9 Incentive contracts are not as important
for the management layer considered here: efficiency wages are sufficient
to extract effort from managers.
Branch level managers are usually supervised by senior management. This
supervision is enough to get them to put effort into supervising the work-
ers underneath. At the base level of the firm, the owner will hire managers
to supervise staff, knowing that this will increase worker effort. A similar
process occurs further up the firm. Calvo & Wellisz (1979) argues that as
we move up in the hierarchy, incentive contracts become more important,
and supervision less so. According to Calvo & Wellisz (1979), we can also
analyse the different layers of the firm individually, by treating external
impacts as exogenous factors.
We have now established the separability of layers within the firm, as well
as the fact that the higher levels of the firm are structured to get branch
managers to provide “optimal effort”. So when analysing the branch level,
we can abstract from higher level managers. The choices further up the
firm will have implications for the production function, but they will be
treated as sunk by the time when output is chosen at the branch level of
the firm.
9However, these incentives may be ignored simply because the degree of effort man-
agers put in may depend more on natural disposition than on the contract given to them.
This argument further justifies the specificity of the managerial input, but we will not use
it to defend the lack of incentive contracts in our manager/worker relationship.
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Worker-manager input relationship
The above argument suggests that the relationship between managers and
workers in a principal-agent setting (akin to the efficiency wage literature)
will define a “technology” combining managerial and worker inputs that
satisfies the typical properties of a production function. These properties
are as follows.
• The choice of inputs should affect output.
• Output should be monotonically increasing in all inputs.
• Each input’s impact on output should diminish as the amount of the
input used increases (holding all else constant). Thus, both inputs
have a declining marginal product.
The assumptions of a monotonically increasing production function and
the falling marginal product of the input are made for convenience, and
are common in the existing literature.
Consider the following simple example. Take a risk neutral worker who
must choose between two effort levels, low and high. If they are not
caught shirking, or are observed to be working hard, they are paid a wage
w. Otherwise they are paid 0. The agent’s cost of high effort is e (e > 0),
while the cost of low effort is 0. Workers choose how much effort to exert
once in the production phase. The probability of being caught when shirk-
ing is equal to P (M) : R+ → (0, 1), where M is the number of managers.
Assume that P (M) is an increasing function.
The incentive constraint for working hard takes the form
wP (M) > e.
We see that the higher the wage is, or the more managers there are, the
harder a worker will work. This suggests that output will be increasing in
the productivity of both workers (as their effort generates the output) and
managers (as they motivate higher worker effort). Calvo & Wellisz (1979)
and Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984) have argued that this result holds in a broad
class of settings, while Machin & Manning (1992) have shown that there is
empirical evidence for this intra-firm phenomenon.
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To summarise, the principal-agent view allows us to model management
and workers as inputs. This observation is important as it allows us to de-
fine a production function that translates these inputs to an output. Fur-
thermore, it will allow us to quantify over-management.
Complementary inputs
Another important aspect of the relationship between managers and work-
ers is revealed by looking at how the production process works. In the case
of managers, we have a production factor that will put in a set amount of
effort at a fixed wage (Rosen 1982). Their role is to supervise workers at the
firm’s base.10 Supervision increases the workers’ effort.11 The relationship
between managers and workers can be viewed as a relationship between
two inputs that are complements in production. The more managers there
are, the less the workers will shirk, and so the marginal product of work-
ers will increase. Similarly, the more workers there are, the greater impact
an additional manager will have on the marginal product of managers.
For a given level of output, managers and workers act as imperfect substi-
tutes. Fundamentally, the more managers a firm has, the higher worker
effort will be, and so the fewer workers will be needed to meet a given
output target. Also, the more workers there are, the less effort is needed
from each worker, and as a result the fewer managers are needed to extract
that effort.
The complementarity and substitutability of these inputs is an important
feature that will drive the results of this thesis.
Conclusion
When discussing labour inputs, we can make the following statements.
10Managers may have other roles, too. However, a large number of these additional
roles are worked on further up the firms hierarchy (as more able staff are hired further
up, more difficult jobs will be placed in their hands). Consequently, we can assume that
the lowest level managerial staff are primarily supervisors
11There could be other reasons for the influence of management on the marginal prod-
uct of workers. They may stem from the planning ability and experience of managers.
Often they have more experience of the job than lower level employees and so advise
them about improving their productive efficiency.
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• Management and workers can be viewed as distinct inputs
• Since management and workers can be considered inputs, we are
able to define a production function that links them to output.
• Management influences production through its supervision role. By
supervising workers, managers increase the marginal productivity
of these workers.
2.4 Firm Decision Process
2.4.1 What sort of horizon is applicable to firm decision
making?
The time horizon is an important element of any game. When defining
the firm’s objective as lifetime profit maximisation, it is important to state
the time frame, so that “lifetime” is accurately defined. We distinguish be-
tween three types of timing: static, finite horizon, and infinite horizon. In a
static model everything occurs at once. In a finite horizon model the game
is played over a finite number of periods. The lifetime profit in such games
is the sum of (discounted) profits over each period throughout the entire
horizon. Finally, in an infinite horizon game there is an infinite number
of periods. In this case the lifetime profit is the infinite discounted sum of
profits realised in each period.
The appropriate time horizon is the one used by firms when they make
decisions, not the actual horizon of a given market. This is a major issue
in finite horizon games: if the endpoint is unknown, a finite game does
not make sense, as it requires a definitive endpoint. Thus, a finite horizon
model seems inappropriate for our analysis. In a static model, firms only
produce and sell to consumers once, and all activities occur simultane-
ously. This is not a realistic description of most markets, and is especially
problematic for the case of department stores/supermarkets. Thus, the
only suitable option is that of an infinite horizon model.
However, a comparative static analysis of the static model, and its coun-
terpart, the two-stage sequential choice model, could provide important
insights into the problem of over-management. Papers by Spence (1977),
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and Brander & Spencer (1983) show that a comparison between the static
and sequential models can serve to illustrate over-investment in capital
and R&D. Since this is the direction taken by most of the literature, it seems
appropriate to start with a two-stage model. Once our results have been
established, we will revisit the issue of the time horizon and see if a move
to an infinite horizon model adds value to the analysis.
2.5 Industry
The industry structure is an important determinant of firms’ choices. Is-
sues like the shape of demand, the type of competition and the number of
firms are essential for input and output decisions. In our models, the most
important requirement will be the strategic interdependence of firms’ pay-
offs. It complicates producers’ choices and distinguishes their problem
from a simple operations research problem.
Firms selling identical or similar goods, along with a set of consumers of
these goods, form a market. The interdependence of the firms’ payoffs can
give rise to strategic interactions in that market. A firm’s action has strate-
gic value if it influences the payoffs (and therefore the actions) of other
firms. How the firm’s choice of management and workers affect the pay-
offs of its competitors, and whether this in turn changes their choices of
management and workers, is of fundamental interest. In order to explore
this issue, we must establish the basic characteristics of the market.
2.5.1 Are firms facing an oligopolistic market or monopo-
listic competition?
There are two main questions regarding our hypothetical market. Firstly,
how many firms are in the market, and secondly, how similar are the
goods these firms sell. Depending on the answers to these questions, we
will consider a setting of oligopolistic competition or a setting of monop-
olistic competition. In the case of few (major) firms we have oligopolis-
tic competition12, and with many firms and a differentiated product, we
have monopolistic competition. The example of department stores should
12Note that oligopolies can produce differentiated as well as homogenous goods.
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shed light on the modeling choice of industry structure. The complicated
nature of this industry suggests that both monopolistic competition and
oligopoly could be potential fits.
Monopolistic Competition
In a monopolistically competitive industry many firms sell differentiated
products. Although the term “many” is not directly quantifiable, the num-
ber of firms must be sufficient for them to be making normal profits in
the long run.13 Also, an individual firm’s choice of output should not in-
fluence the prices faced by the other firms in the industry. This is prob-
lematic for the purpose of our thesis, as it implies that the action of one
player does not influence the actions of its competitors. As a result, there
is no strategic incentive for the firm to increase their managerial input be-
yond the cost minimising level. If monopolistic competition described the
industry best, strategic investment would not provide an explanation of
over-management.
At first glance, monopolistic competition seems like a good description of
how retail department stores compete at the branch level. At a given loca-
tion, the branch competes with all other retail outlets, irrespective of their
total size. As a result, retailers that only have one store nationwide can
be equal competitors with a large organisation at the branch level. Fur-
thermore, retailers tend to sell differentiated goods to consumers, making
their product fall into some niche.
Oligopoly
In an oligopoly there are few firms selling substitutable products, and firm
entry and exit do not fully respond to super-normal profits in the indus-
try. The assumptions of few firms and of substitutable products deliver the
strategic environment needed to generate value of commitment. This oc-
curs because an increase in a firm’s output decreases the other firms’ price.
As a result, an input that can be used to commit the firm to a higher out-
put will reduce other firms’ marginal profits, thus reducing competitors’
13In the department store example, strip retailing would appear to partially support
this claim.
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output levels.
Oligopolistic competition between department stores can be motivated in
the following way. In many cities, the size and capacity of the major de-
partment stores far exceed the other retail stores around them. Large re-
tailers often sell a significant range of goods, competing with other firms
along a range of taste parameters. When the branches of big retail firms
are sufficiently larger than their niche competitors, we have a plausible
case for oligopoly competition.
The strategic investment explanation of over-management requires strate-
gic interaction between the firms. Such interactions can take place in an
oligopolistic market. Therefore, our results will be applicable to industries
where the oligopolistic model holds. Retail competition between depart-
ment stores can fit into an oligopolistic setting. However, we should ex-
pect to see over-management occur more often in areas where department
stores are the dominant retail firms. This limits the scope of applicability
of our model. Nevertheless, many industries seem to satisfy the definition
of oligopoly, implying that this requirement may not be too stringent.
Given the assumption of oligopolistic industry, we also need to discuss the
issue of product differentiation, i.e. how substitutable the firms’ products
are. Each department store sells a variety of goods. The choice of products
could itself be seen as a choice variable for the firm. However, this choice
is made further up the chain of command, and so we will ignore it. For
simplicity we will assume that each firm produces a homogeneous retail
good x.
To recap, when modeling over-management, we will focus on an oligopolis-
tic industry producing a homogeneous good. The assumption of homo-
geneity is not essential, but the assumption of an oligopoly is. If the mar-
ket did not fit into the oligopoly setting, then there would be no strategic
benefits of management, and the strategic investment motive would not
provide an explanation of over-management.
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2.5.2 How are the firms’ choice variables related to the struc-
ture of the industry?
Bertrand or Cournot?
The question of whether firms compete in prices or quantities can have im-
portant implications for the equilibrium outcome. Since Bertrand’s 1883
criticism (Bertrand 1883) of Cournot’s 1838 quantity game (Cournot 1897),
economists have argued about the proper way to model competition. The
controversy stems from the fact that most economists believe that firms
compete by choosing prices, yet the equilibrium of a simple homogeneous-
good price game is too extreme. In a Bertrand duopoly, two firms sell-
ing homogenous goods would reach the same equilibrium as with perfect
competition (namely price equals marginal cost). In reality, however, firm
behaviour resembles that of a Cournot oligopoly. This phenomenon is
known as the Bertrand paradox.
Thus, we are left with a problem. Firms seem to follow the Bertrand ap-
proach in a sense that they compete by choosing prices, but the Cournot
model yields outcomes that are closer to what we observe in reality (Cabral
2000). The literature offers three solutions to the Bertrand Paradox:
• Goods are imperfect substitutes, so firms can charge a markup on
cost even if they compete in prices;
• Competition is repeated, so firms can collude and set prices higher
than those in a static Bertand model (see Green & Porter (1984), Fu-
denberg & Tirole (1996), and Ivaldi, Jullien, Rey, Seabright & Tirole
(2003));
• Firms are capacity constrained, and so cannot produce the quantity
which equalises price and marginal cost (see Brock & Scheinkman
(1985) and Dragan (n.d.)).
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Strategic substitutes/complements
In many settings, one firm’s marginal payoff is decreasing in the other
firms’ output levels.14 That is, in quantity games output levels are strategic
substitutes. The graphical interpretation is that the players’ output reac-
tion functions are downward sloping. If firms compete in prices instead,
then their choice of management and workers would affect the prices they
set. When firms compete in prices, usually one firm’s marginal payoff is
increasing in the other firms’ prices.15 Thus, in Bertrand games prices are
strategic complements.
Consider a game in strategic complements, i.e. in prices. If the firm can
commit, it would set a price that is higher than the static Bertrand equi-
librium. This will increase the marginal profit of their competitor. On the
other hand, in games of strategic substitutes (i.e. quantity games) a firm
would like to commit to a quantity above that of a static Cournot equi-
librium. This will reduce the marginal profit of their competitor. Con-
sequently, committable management would behave differently in these
games. In particular, if the firm commits in a price game, we should ob-
serve “under-management”. On the other hand, in a quantity game com-
mitment would lead to “over-management”. In this thesis, we assume that
an increase in management will increase quantity and reduce price. Since
the strategic properties of competition are rather important, they require
further discussion.
Flexibility and input choice
Dixon (1986) elaborates on the essential differences between price and
quantity competition. He states that the flexibility of a firms output choice
is important in determining what model to use. Flexibility relates to the
degree the firm can change an input in the very short run. He focuses on
the choice of capital and labour inputs. In his model there are three possi-
ble input flexibility combinations during the production stage of a game;
fixed capital and fixed labour, fixed capital but variable labour, and finally
14Matematically, if pii is the profit of a firm, xi is its quantity and xj is its competitors




15Mathematically, if pii is the profit of a firm, pi is its price and pj is its competitors
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variable capital and variable labour.
In Dixon’s model, market demand is a function of price a la Bertrand. This
implies that the output stage is competitive. When both inputs are vari-
able, the standard Bertrand result applies. However, when both inputs are
fixed, the output game becomes a game in capacities. It yields the Cournot
equilibrium. Therefore, as long as the firm cannot adjust inputs quickly, a
Cournot specification would be suitable.
In the case of department stores, we have a fixed level of capital stock,
specifically checkouts. Except for management and workers, all inputs
are determined exogenously.16 At the department store level, price com-
petition occurs daily. However, the size of the worker input is constrained
by a roster17, and, as previously stated, the managerial input takes even
longer to adjust. Thus, when analysing the choice of the labour input in a
department store on a week by week basis, a Cournot output game seems
appropriate, as it is effectively setting the capacity in the daily price games.
Worker input, flexibility and observability
Our assumption that the worker input is adjustable allows us to treat it
as un-committable. However, the above argument also implies that, at
some time scale, it can be used for strategic commitment. The ability of
the worker input to serve as a commitment instrument will depend on the
adjustment cost of that input. However, “inflexibility” is only a necessary,
not sufficient, condition for an input to be used for commitment. As we
will discuss later, the worker input cannot be used for strategic investment
because it is not observable.
Adjustment costs, the short run, and the long run
There is one further complication that has to be taken into consideration.
Dixit (1997) discusses the adjustment cost of inputs in the short run and
in the long run. By definition, the difference between the short run and
the long run is in the flexibility of factors of production. In the short run,
16This comes from the fact that these decisions are made further up the vertical chain.
17This point will be important when discussing the adjustment cost of changing the
worker input.
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some factors of production, such as capital, are fixed, while others, such
as labour, are variable. However, in the long run both capital and labour
are fully adjustable. According to Dixit, this distinction is not appropri-
ate. In order to understand the choice of inputs, we need to study the
costs associated with adjusting a given input. There is always some cost
to changing an input. The big difference between capital and labour is the
fact that the cost of adjusting capital (in the short run) is greater than the
cost of adjusting labour.
We already argued that a firm’s managerial input is harder to adjust than
its worker input. In the context of the short versus the long run, this im-
plies that the worker input is more likely to be adjusted in the short run
than other less flexible inputs such as management. So in the two-stage
model it is appropriate to view workers as adjustable in the short run,
while management will be treated as unadjustable. Thus, when workers
are chosen and output is determined, the managerial input is fixed. One
consequence of this assumption is that the wage bill of managers becomes
a fixed cost during the production stage.
Defining managerial and worker input choices in this way suffers from
the same criticism that Dixit (1997) leveled at the short run to long run dis-
tinction between capital and labour. That is, it is unrealistic to assume that
the worker input is costless to adjust at the start of the market stage, while
the managerial input is infinitely costly to adjust at the start of the mar-
ket stage. Nevertheless, this approach provides a starting point to analyse
over-management. Our assumptions will be discussed in further detail in
Chapter 4.
Conclusion
To summarise, this section we made the following assumptions:
• The output stage of the firm’s game takes the form of Cournot com-
petition.
• The managerial input is chosen before output is determined.
• To determine output, the firm must also choose its worker input.
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2.6 Core Assumptions
The preceding sections specified the assumptions that will be used in the
strategic investment models. Some of these assumptions (e.g. the assump-
tion of homogenous goods) were made for simplicity, and relaxing them
should not qualitatively affect our results. These assumptions are periph-
eral.
However there are other assumptions (e.g. the assumption of oligopolistic
industry), that are essential to our hypothesis. These are the core assump-
tions. In the first model of strategic investment, the core assumptions are
as follows:
• Management and workers can be modeled as inputs.
• It is infinitely costly to change the level of managerial input at the
start of the output stage.
• It is costless to change the level of worker input at the start of the
output stage.
• A incremental increase in the managerial input increases the marginal
product of the worker input.18
• Firms can observe each others’ choice of managerial input.
• Firms compete in an oligopolistic industry.
• Firms engage in Cournot competition (their quantities are strategic
substitutes).
These assumptions are essential for over-management in the two-period
setting. Relaxing some of them will require a substantial change of the
model. The issues of information and timing in the game turn out to be
important. Later in the thesis we will also discuss the cost of inputs, and
how it is incorporated in the model.
18Note: we model this by assuming that management only influences production
through supervision.
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2.6.1 Grouping the Assumptions
Our assumptions can be grouped in six categories. These categories yield
a set of sufficient conditions for the result to hold in a two-stage model.
They are:
1. That the managerial input positively influences the marginal product
of other inputs.19
2. That the managerial input is an “irreversible investment”, while other
inputs are flexible.
3. That the managerial input is observable to other firms, but other in-
puts are not.
4. Firms operate in a duopolistic setting
5. Firms compete in quantities
Assumptions 4 and 5 are standard simplifying assumptions. They reflect
profit maximisation, and the simplest version of Cournot, the Cournot
duopoly.20 Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are common in the strategic investment
literature. They are the extra conditions needed for our results. They in-
volve assumptions about the nature of the managerial input.21 The role of
management in a given industry is an important determinant of whether
it can be seen as a strategic investment resource. Therefore, the assump-
tions about the managerial input are very important for explaining over-
management, and must be defended before any model can be analysed.
Other elements of the model like the shape of market demand and costs
will also be important. These will be described when we specify the model.
19Note: we use workers as a type of input that can be compared to management. How-
ever, managers may influence the marginal product of other inputs, as well.
20We discuss weakening the duopoly assumption in Appendix B.
21Note that we have not explicitly specified assumptions for the the worker input. This




As discussed earlier, the firm’s choice of labour is often viewed differently
to the choice of other factors of production. When studying labour inputs,
there is often a focus on the provision of incentives within a principal-
agent relationship. Papers by Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Holstrom &
Milgrom (1991) have shown that such relationships are important for re-
lating the labour input of a firm to their choice of output. We aim to show a
separate but equally important characteristic of the labour input: its com-
mitment value.
3.1 Commitment value of management
Papers by Spence (1977) and Brander & Spencer (1983) found that strate-
gic commitment can influence firm decisions such as capital investment
and research and development. In these papers, the core assumptions that
generate the commitment value of a given input are listed below.
• The irreversibility of the input
• The observability of the input by other firms
• The input must shift the reaction function of the firm
If we decompose the labour input into managerial and worker types, the
conditions for management to behave as a committable resource will be as
28
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follows.
• Management is viewed as fixed when the other inputs are chosen
• The management input must be observed by other firms
• The management input must be able to influence the level of output
Exactly how this process works will be shown by way of a mathemati-
cal model. But first it is important to relate the conditions of Brander &
Spencer (1983) to the three conditions stated above.
3.1.1 Irreversibility
The argument that the management input is fixed stems from its irre-
versibility. Irreversibility of management can be observed clearly in a de-
partment store, where both managers and workers are used as inputs. We
assume that the appropriate time period for a stage in this analysis is one
month.1 For an input to be fixed during a period of time, we require both
the extensive and the intensive margins to remain unchanged. As men-
tioned in chapter 2, in the context of a given firm, the extensive margin
refers to the number of employees. The intensive margin then refers to
the hours that each employee contributes. For the extensive margin to be
fixed, the firm should not be able to remove or hire employees. For the
intensive margin to be fixed, the firm should not be able to change the
number of hours that employees work.
In the case of the managerial input, both margins are fixed. The extensive
margin is fixed as it is impossible to remove managers and difficult to add
them over the relevant time period. This is due to the contractual difficul-
ties of removing current managers and the cost of training new ones. The
intensive margin is fixed as the management staff are on salaries which
pay them for a set number of worked hours. Since both margins are fixed,
the managerial input cannot be changed during this time frame. There-
fore, management can be viewed as irreversible.
1If a manager decides to leave the job/training programme, he has to give a one
month’s notice.
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The argument for irreversibility of management can be summarised as fol-
lows.
1. The extensive margin of management is fixed at the time of the firms’
choice of output;
2. the intensive margin of management is fixed at the time of the firms’
choice of output. Therefore,
3. management is irreversible at the time of the firms’ choice of output.
Conversely, the worker input is not a fixed resource during a given month.
At the extensive margin, workers are cheap to remove and replace. It is
also relatively simple for firms to hire additional workers in a short time
frame if they want to increase production. At the intensive margin, work-
ers are paid an hourly wage, and work according to an adjustable weekly
roster. This allows some flexibility in changing the worker input from
week to week. As a result, the worker input is flexible over the relevant
time period.
Department store competition can thus can be modeled as a game where
the worker input is chosen repeatedly (say weekly) over the month, while
the managerial input is fixed up-front. The irreversibility assumption is
stronger than the previous chapter’s argument that management is costly
to adjust. This will become an important issue when discussing the results
of the model.
3.1.2 Observability
In addition to being irreversible, management must be observed by all
players. Otherwise it will not influence the choices of other firms. Observ-
ability is presumed to come from the irreversible nature of the managerial
resource. As argued, the intensive and extensive margins of management
cannot be changed. Thus, if the firm’s opponents observe this input in
one period, they will have observed its value over the entire game. In this
thesis, we assume that firms are able to observe the number of managers
hired by their competitors at the start of the game.2
2Our approach is similar to that of the strategic investment literature, which postulates
that the capital stock of a given firm can be observed by all players.
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The argument for observability of the managerial input can be summarised
as follows.
1. Management is irreversible when firms choose output.
2. Competitors can easily verify the number of managers a firm has at
the start of a game.
3. The number of hours a manager works are fixed, and known by
other firms. Therefore,
4. Management is observable when the firm chooses its output level.
The combination of irreversibility and observability justifies the use of a
sequential model of labour input choice in which the managerial input is
set first, and the worker input is set second.
3.1.3 The effect of management on output
In the following models, we also have to specify how management influ-
ences the choice of worker input and output levels.
In our department store example, we will assume that quantities are strate-
gic substitutes. That is, an increase in a firm’s output level reduces the op-
ponent’s marginal profit. The combination of strategic substitutability, ir-
reversibility, and observability provides a setting where strategic commit-
ment can play an important role. Papers by Spence (1977) and Brander &
Spencer (1983) show that, in a game where quantities are strategic substi-
tutes, strategic considerations may lead to an excessive use of the commit-
ment resource. If the managerial input can be used for strategic commit-
ment, then this will deliver a potential explanation of over-management.
Given strategic substitutability of output levels, we show that complemen-
tarity of labour inputs is a sufficient condition for over-management. This
complementarity implies that the choice of the unobservable resource will
not be made in a way that completely offsets or reverses the impact of the
observable factor of production. This will allow firms to use the manage-
rial input as an effective commitment device.
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3.2 Summary argument
Our earlier discussion led to the following argument.
1. Management influences the final level of output;
2. management is irreversible when the firms choose output;
3. management is observable when the firms choose output. Therefore,
4. management can be used for strategic commitment (from (1), (2) and
(3)).
The model below aims to illustrate the logical link between premises 1, 2,
and 3 and our conclusion, 4.
3.3 General setting
Suppose that there are two firms, A and B, that engage in quantity com-
petition. Each player uses two inputs: management and workers. Firm
A’s management and workers are denoted by M and L respectively, while
firm B’s management and workers are denoted by M˜ and L˜. Given the
available technology, these input bundles will determine the firms’ output
levels. Let A’s production function be x = f(L,M) and B’s production
function be x˜ = f˜(L˜, M˜).
The prices that firms A and B face are determined by the inverse demand
functions P (x, x˜) and P˜ (x˜, x). We also assume linear input costs, rM +wL
and rM˜ + wL˜, respectively, where r is the wage of a manager and w is the
wage of a worker. Since r and w are prices, we will assume that r > 0, w >
0.
Given the production functions of A and B, the payoff functions of these
firms take the form
pi(L,M, L˜, M˜) = P (f(L,M), f˜(L˜, M˜))f(L,M)− rM − wL
p˜i(L˜, M˜ , L,M) = P˜ (f˜(L˜, M˜), f(L,M))f˜(L˜, M˜)− rM˜ − wL˜.
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For notational simplicity, we define the revenue functions in the following
way:
R(x, x˜) = P (x, x˜)x
R˜(x˜, x) = P˜ (x˜, x)x˜.
We use a subscript i to denote the partial derivative of a function with re-
spect to its i-th argument. For example, the expression R1(x, x˜) is defined
as ∂R/∂x. Similarly, two subscripts denote second-order derivatives. As-
sume that R, R˜ satisfy:
R1,2 < 0, R˜1,2 < 0, R1,1 < 0, R2,2 < 0, R˜1,1 < 0, R˜2,2 < 0.
Thus, we can write profits as
pi(L,M, L˜, M˜) = R(f(L,M), f˜(L˜, M˜))− wL− rM
p˜i(L˜, M˜ , L,M) = R˜(f˜(L˜, M˜), f(L,M))− wL˜− rM˜
Firms choose their inputs to maximise these payoff functions. For brevity
sometimes we will suppress the arguments of the revenue functions:
pi = R− rM − wL
p˜i = R˜− wL˜− rM˜ .
3.4 Cost minimising input bundles
It is useful to compare the choice of inputs that arise in oligopolistic com-
petition to the input bundle that minimises the cost of producing the equi-
librium output levels. Costs are minimised if, for a given level of output,
inputs are chosen to produce that output at the least cost.
Consider the cost minimisation problem of firm A. Its goal is to minimise
the input cost C = wL + rM while producing at least some target level
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of output x∗ = f(L,M). Assume an interior solution. The corresponding
Lagrangian is:
Ł(L,M, λ) = wL+ rM + λ(x∗ − f(L,M)) (3.1)
Differentiating with respect to L, M and λ yields the following first-order
conditions:
Ł1 = w − λf1 = 0⇐⇒ w = λf1
Ł2 = r − λf2 = 0⇐⇒ r = λf2
Ł3 = x∗ − f(L,M) = 0.







This necessary condition states that the ratio of worker to manager wages
must be equal to the marginal rate of technical substitution between these
two inputs.
3.5 Static competition
Our first model is a one-shot game in which firms choose all their labour
inputs simultaneously. It provides a benchmark for comparison with the
sequential model considered later in this chapter. In the simultaneous-
move game, the opponent’s managerial input is not observable, and so
neither firm has information about the other firm’s choices. Without ob-
servability, the managerial input has no commitment value.
In an interior equilibrium, we can characterise firm A’s optimal choice of
inputs by taking the first-order conditions with respect to L and M . The
derivatives of firm A’s payoff function are:
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pi1 = R1f1 − w (3.2)
pi2 = R1f2 − r (3.3)
We can obtain similar expressions for firmB. We will refer to these deriva-
tives as the marginal profits of the inputs. Setting the marginal profit of each
input to zero delivers first-order conditions for the profit-maximizing in-













This condition must hold in any Nash equilibrium where firms simulta-
neously choose inputs to maximise profits. It is the same as the neces-
sary condition we obtained for the cost minimisation problem. For a fixed
level of output x, there is only one input bundle that can satisfy this ratio,
provided that the marginal products are decreasing in the level of the re-
spective input. Therefore, equilibrium output will be produced using the
cost-minimising input bundles. This establishes the duality between cost
minimisation and profit maximisation in the simultaneous-move game.
As long as inputs are chosen in an unobservable or fully reversible way,
the two problems have the same solution.
However, this static model is not a realistic representation of competi-
tion involving branch level managers. As we will show, a more plausible
setting will generate the result of over-management. The purpose of the
above model was to provide a benchmark which helps us define the idea
of over-management.
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3.6 Unilateral commitment
3.6.1 Motivation
The benchmark model did not take into account the irreversible and ob-
servable nature of the managerial input. Thus, it ignored the role of man-
agement as a committable resource. The first step in illustrating how irre-
versibility and observability of management can change firm behaviour is
to analyse the case when only one firm chooses its management up front.
In other words, only one firm will be able to use management as a com-
mitment instrument.
The purpose of this exercise is two-fold. By illustrating how a single firm’s
actions change when its management input is observable and irreversible,
we can study the difference that these attributes make. Furthermore, by
comparing the payoff of the committed firm to the payoff this firm re-
ceives without committing, we can determine whether the firm gains an
advantage by choosing to commit.
Our analysis relates to the idea of flexibility in Dixon (1986). Dixon “endo-
genises” the firm’s choice of labour flexibility by comparing the equilibria
in a number of games with varying rigidity. It is important to note that our
notion of flexibility differs from the concept used in real options analysis.
In that literature, firms value flexibility(Dixit & Pindyck 1995) because it
gives them room to adjust when the elements of the model3 are stochastic.
Therefore, in such models flexibility has value.
In this thesis, flexibility is detrimental to the players. If a firm could undo
its former choices during the competition stage, then it cannot commit
to an action that may prevent entry, or increase profits. When strategic
considerations enter the decision process of the firm, self-interest can be
its worst enemy. Later chapters will underscore the importance of this
idea.
3e.g. demand for the product
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3.6.2 Commitment as a choice
The choice to commit is a theoretical device used to explain why the game
may be such that players are able to commit. Fundamentally, the firm
could set up the game in a way which allows it to commit. In such a
setting, the structure of the game itself becomes endogenous, as firms can
invest in creating the type of game they play.
There are three situations in which a firm may have an incentive to invest
in creating commitment opportunities:
1. Managerial input cannot be adjusted; here the firm will allow their
managerial input to be observed by other firms at no cost.
2. Managerial input is observable, so firms design contracts which make
the managerial input ex post irreversible.
3. Managerial input is neither observable or irreversible, however it is
cheaper to invest in making the managerial input observable and ir-
reversible than doing so with other inputs.
If profits from committing exceed those from not committing, firms may
end up playing a prisoners’ dilemma. Consider the following symmetric
game.
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Suppose that if only one firm can commit, that firm gets a payoff of pi(C,D).
Let pi(D,D) be the payoff each firm obtains in the benchmark simultaneous-
move game considered earlier. Assume that pi(C,C) > pi(D,C) and pi(C,D) >
pi(D,D). Then committing would be a dominant strategy: it will bring a
higher payoff no matter what the other firm is doing.
If pi(D,D) > pi(C,C), we will have a game where firms are jointly made
worse off by their commitment. That game would be a prisoner’s dilemma
in terms of the choice of whether to commit or not. This is an important
consideration to keep in mind when we discuss the “horizon” of the game
in chapter 4.
In the sequential move game, we will show that a firm would prefer to
commit if the other firm is committing. In other words, commitment is
profitable. As a result of this, firms will have an incentive to make the
managerial input irreversible or observable in the three ways mentioned
above.
3.6.3 The unilateral commitment game
In the benchmark case, we assumed that all inputs were chosen at the same
time. This assumption was not critical, since input choices were unobserv-
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able. However, when studying commitment, timing becomes a crucial el-
ement of the game. In our next model, firms’ choices will be made in the
following order:
Stage 1: Firm A chooses their level of managerial input, M .
Stage 2: Both firms observe the value of M . Then firm A chooses their
worker input L, and firm B chooses their managerial and worker inputs,
M˜ and L˜, respectively.
To find the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, we use back-
ward induction. First, we solve for the stage-two game equilibrium inputs,
L, M˜ and L˜, while holding M fixed. This allows us to write these labour
inputs as functions of M . Substituting these functions into firm A’s stage-
one problem, we can solve for firm A’s subgame-perfect choice of M . The
value ofM can then be inserted into the functions forL, M˜ and L˜ to deliver
their subgame-perfect equilibrium values.
Stage 2
Starting from stage two, we first compute the derivative of firm A’s profit
with respect to L, as well as the derivatives of firm B’s profit with respect
to M˜ and L˜. When these derivatives are set equal to zero, they deliver
first-order conditions that determine the optimal choices of L, M˜ and L˜
for a given level of management M :
pi1 = R1f1 − w = 0
p˜i1 = R˜1f˜1 − w˜ = 0
p˜i2 = R˜1f˜2 − r˜ = 0
Note that if the value of M was the same as in the benchmark case, these
first-order conditions would yield equilibrium values for the other inputs
that are the same as in the simultaneous-move game. However, since M
is used for strategic commitment, its subgame-perfect equilibrium value
will be different.
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Stage 1
The above first-order conditions define the stage-two equilibrium inputs
L, M˜ and L˜ as functions of M . Let these functions be L∗(M), L˜∗(M) and
M˜∗(M). Since A correctly infers how its choice of management affects B’s
stage-2 choice of inputs, these functions must be substituted into firm A’s
stage-1 objective. Thus, in the first stage, A’s payoff function takes the
form:
pi∗(M) = R(f(L∗(M),M), f˜(L˜∗(M), M˜∗(M)))− wL∗(M)− rM .
Firm A’s optimal choice of M in that stage is then determined by the first-
order condition pi∗2 = 0. Differentiating A’s profit function and applying
the envelope theorem, we obtain:
∂pi∗
∂M
= R1f2 +R2(f˜1L˜1 + f˜2M˜1)− r. (3.5)
Implications for stage-1 management
Recall our assumption that the marginal product of labour inputs is de-
creasing. It implies that if ∂pi∗/∂M is positive for the value of M that
solves ∂pi/∂M = 0, then the subgame-perfect equilibrium choice of M in
the unilateral commitment game will be higher. The verbal argument is as
follows. Since the production function is concave in inputs, the marginal
profit of management is monotonically decreasing inM . Thus, if ∂pi∗/∂M >
0 when ∂pi/∂M = 0, then the first-order condition ∂pi∗/∂M = 0 will be sat-
isfied for a higher value of M . Consequently, the subgame-perfect man-
agement must be higher than that in the simultaneous-move game.













= R2(f˜1L˜1 + f˜2M˜2). (3.6)
We assumed that firm A’s revenue is decreasing in B’s output: R2 < 0.
Thus, a sufficient condition for expression (6) to be positive is that L˜1 < 0
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and M˜1 < 0. In other words, we have to show that the firms’ management
levels are strategic substitutes, and that firmB’s worker input and firmA’s
managerial input are strategic substitutes. Since L˜∗ is implicitly defined by
the first-order condition p˜i1 = 0, the effect of M on L˜∗ will depend on how
M affects B’s marginal profit p˜i1. In particular, if p˜i1,2 < 0, then L˜1 < 0 4. A
symmetric argument holds for M˜ .
One way to solve the problem is to explicitly derive the slopes L1, L˜1, and
M˜1 of the three functions. These functions are defined by three stage-2
first-order conditions pi1 = 0, p˜i1 = 0, p˜i2 = 0. Therefore, we can obtain L1,
L˜1, and M˜1 by differentiating these first-order conditions with respect to
M .
Alternative representation
To simplify the analysis, we now explore an alternative formulation of
the unilateral commitment game. It is convenient to study an equivalent
game where, in stage 2, firm B competes by choosing its output q˜ rather
than the labour inputs L˜ and M˜ . This new game reduces the dimension of
firm B’s strategy space, which allows us to use standard techniques from
the strategic investment literature.
Suppose that, in stage 2, firms A and B choose L and q˜, respectively, to
maximise
ψ(L,M, q˜) = R(f(M,L), q˜)− rM − wL
and
ψ˜(q˜, L,M) = R˜(q˜, f(L,M))− C˜(q˜),
where C˜(q˜) is firm B’s cost as a function of output.5 Just as before, the
stage-2 Nash equilibrium defines q˜ and L as functions of M . Let these
functions be q˜∗(M) and L∗(M). In stage 1, firm A would choose manage-
ment to maximise its stage-two equilibrium profit
4As M reduces the marginal profit of L˜, implying that a lower value of L˜∗ is now
optimal
5The cost function is obtained from firm B’s cost minimization problem.
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ψ∗(M) = R(f(M,L∗(M)), q˜∗(M))− rM − wL∗(M).
Since this game is equivalent to the unilateral commitment game consid-
ered earlier, it must be true that
q˜∗(M) ≡ f˜(L˜∗(M), M˜∗(M)).
The stage-2 first-order conditions are:
R1(f(L
∗(M),M), q˜∗(M))f1(L∗(M),M))− w = 0
and
R˜1(q˜
∗(M), f(L∗(M),M))− C˜(q˜∗(M)) = 0.
Applying the implicit function theorem to these first-order conditions al-











Solving these equations simultaneously for q˜∗1 delivers
q˜∗1 = −
(R1,1f1f1 +R1f1,1)R˜1,2f2 − (R1,1f1f2 +R1f1,2)R˜1,2f1
(R1,1f1f1 +R1f1,1)(R˜1,1 − C˜1,1)−R1,2f1R˜1,2f1
.
Stability of the stage-2 game Nash equilibrium requires that the denomi-
nator of the above expression is positive.6 The assumption that R1,2 < 0
implies that the sign of q˜∗1 is equal to the sign of the numerator (R1,1f1f1 +
R1f1,1)f2 − (R1,1f1f2 + R1f1,2)f1. In other words, for our result we require
6See the discussion of the Routh-Hurwicz condition below.
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that the impact of the worker input on the marginal profit of workers ex-
ceeds the impact of the management input on the marginal profit of work-
ers. As long as this condition is satisfied, an increase in the managerial
input will reduce the other firm’s output.
We can provide an alternative interpretation of this condition. Note that
the sign of q˜∗1 must be equal to the sign of R1(f1,1f2 − f1,2f1). We know
that (f1,1f2 − f1,2f1) will be positive as long as L is a “normal input”. The
worker input is called normal if, for a higher output level, the cost min-
imising bundle involves more of that input. Mathematically, L is a normal
input if the marginal rate of technical substitution (−f2
f1
) is decreasing in
L. Differentiating the MRTS with respect to L yields (f1,1f2 − f1,2f1)/(f1)2.
Therefore, a decreasing MRTS would require that f1,1f2−f1,2f1 > 0, which
in turn implies that our result will hold.
A sufficient condition for q˜∗1 < 0 is that there is complementarity between
the two inputs: f1,2 > 0.7 Even when the production function is additively
separable in inputs (i.e. f1,2 = 0), the expression will have the required
sign as long as f1,1 < 0.
3.6.4 Over-management
Having established that q˜∗1 < 0, we now explore whether the subgame-
perfect equilibrium exhibits over-management.
















7In chapter 2, we justified this assumption by appealing to the hierarchy literature
CHAPTER 3. MODEL ONE 44
If this input bundle satisfies the cost minimisation condition, it will vio-
late the equilibrium condition of the game. Since q˜∗1 < 0, the left hand
side (the ratio of the marginal revenue products) will be less than the right
hand side (the ratio of the marginal costs). To achieve equality, we would
need to either increase the numerator (the marginal revenue product of the
worker input), decrease the denominator (the marginal revenue product
of the managerial input), or both. Given our assumption that the marginal
revenue product of both inputs falls as the amount of the input rises, this
can be accomplished by decreasing L or increasing M .8 Thus, in equi-
librium the firm will choose a more “manager intensive” combination of
inputs relative to the cost minimising bundle. In other words, we will
observe over-management.
3.7 Bilateral commitment
So far we have motivated why one firm may want to implement over-
management. However, if one firm has the incentive to hire excess man-
agers, then its competitors may also have a similar incentive. To anal-
yse the case where multiple firms commit to management, we study a
duopoly game in which both firms choose their managers up-front.
The stages of the bilateral commitment game are as follows:
Stage 1: Both firms choose their levels of managerial inputs, M and M˜ ,
simultaneously.
Stage 2: The firms observe the values of M and M˜ . Given management
levels, they then choose their worker inputs. Once L and L˜ have been
chosen, the output levels are determined and sold on the market.
Again, we characterise the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game us-
ing backward induction.
8Assuming that the impact of M on the marginal revenue product of management
exceeds the impact of M on the marginal revenue product of the worker input
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3.7.1 Stage 2
Differentiating the payoff functions with respect to the firm’s choice of
worker input yields the following stage two first-order conditions:
pi1 = R1f1 − w = 0
p˜i1 = R˜1f˜1 − w = 0
They would be identical to the first-order conditions of the simultaneous-
move game if each firm chose the same level of managerial input as it did
in the static benchmark.
The stage-2 equilibrium choice of worker input is consistent with short-
run cost minimisation. During that stage, expenditure on management is
a fixed cost. In the short run (stage two), the variable cost is driven en-
tirely by the worker input. When there is a single input, cost minimisation
simply involves choosing the input that can produce the target level of
output.
3.7.2 Stage 1
The first-order conditions for L and L˜ define the stage-two equilibrium
worker inputs as functions of management. Let these functions beL∗∗(M, M˜)
and L˜∗∗(M˜,M). We will use them to determine the choice of management
in stage 1. After substituting L∗∗ and L˜∗∗, the payoff functions of firms A
and B take the form:
pi∗∗(M, M˜) = R(f(L(M, M˜),M), f˜(L˜(M˜,M), M˜))− wL(M, M˜)− rM
p˜i∗∗(M˜,M) = R(f˜(L˜(M˜,M), M˜), f(L(M, M˜),M))− wL˜(M˜,M)− rM˜
In stage 1, firms choose their management inputs to maximise pi∗∗(M, M˜)
and p˜i∗∗(M˜,M), respectively. Differentiating pi∗∗(M, M˜) with respect to M
yields the first-order condition:





1 + f2) +R2(f˜1L˜
∗∗
2 )− wL1 − r = 0 (3.9)





1 + f˜2) + R˜2(f1L
∗∗
2 )− w˜L˜∗∗1 − r˜ = 0 (3.10)
Equations 3.9 and 3.10 take into account that managerial inputs will have
an impact on both the firm’s own choice of workers (through L∗∗1 and L˜∗∗1 ,
respectively) and on the opponent’s choice of workers (through L∗∗2 and
L˜∗∗2 , respectively).
3.7.3 Comparison with the simultaneous-move game
A comparison of these first-order conditions to those from the simultaneous-
move game yields a difference of R2f˜1L˜∗∗2 . The marginal profit in the
simultaneous-move game will be equal to that in the sequential-move
game when, for fixed managerial inputs, this difference term vanishes:
R2f˜1L˜
∗∗
2 = 0. (3.11)
If R2f˜1L˜∗∗2 > 0, management will be higher in the bilateral commitment
game. To see that, let us fix management at the static benchmark levels.
Then its marginal revenue in the bilateral commitment game will exceed
its marginal cost. This implies that it is optimal to increase management.9
Given our assumption that R2 < 0, we therefore have to show that L˜∗∗2 <
0. In other words, firm B’s optimal worker input must be decreasing in
A’s managerial input. Note that this does not necessarily follow from the
strategic substitutability of output levels. It is possible that committing to
a higher value of M may cause an even bigger decrease in L, so that the
overall effect is a fall in production. In that case, an increase in M will
actually increase the marginal revenue (and hence the marginal profit) of
firm B. This, in turn, will result in B choosing a higher level of L˜.
The stage-2 equilibrium choices or worker inputs are implicitly defined
by the first-order conditions ∂pi
∂L
= 0 and ∂p˜i
∂L˜
= 0. Thus, we can apply the
9Assuming diminishing marginal products of the two inputs.
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implicit function theorem to find the slopes L∗∗1 , L∗∗2 , L˜∗∗1 , L˜∗∗2 of the firms’




































1 + f˜1,2) = 0
This system of equations has four unknowns: L∗∗1 , L∗∗2 , L˜∗∗1 , L˜∗∗2 . Solving for
L˜∗∗2 yields:
L˜∗∗2 = −
R˜1,2f˜1 [f2(R1,1f1f1 +R1f1,1)− f1(R1,1f1f2 +R1f1,2)]
(R1,1f1f1 +R1f1,1)(R˜1,1f˜1f˜1 + R˜1f˜1,1)−R1,2f1f˜1R˜1,2f1f˜1
. (3.12)
Again, dynamic stability of the stage-2 game requires that the denomina-











This term must be positive, otherwise the Nash equilibrium of the quan-
tity game will be unstable. This assumption is common in the literature
(Brander & Spencer 1983). It is known as the Routh-Hurwicz condition.
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As long as the impact of the worker input on the marginal profit of work-
ers exceeds the impact of the managerial input on the marginal profit of
workers, the denominator will be positive.
The Routh-Hurwicz condition, together with the assumptions that R1,2 <
0 and R˜1,2 < 0, imply that the sign of L˜∗∗2 is the same as the sign of
f2(R1,1f1f1 + R1f1,1) − f1(R1,1f1f2 + R1f1,2). After simplification, the nu-
merator can be written as R1(f1,1f2 − f1,2f1). Given the assumption that
f1,2 > 0 and f1,1 < 0, this expression is positive. Therefore, we get L˜∗∗2 < 0.
3.7.4 Over-management and cost minimisation in the se-
quential game
In the static benchmark case, the equilibrium (and also cost minimising)













Remember the assumption that R2 < 0. Also, we have established that if
f1,2 > 0, then L˜∗∗2 < 0. Thus, it follows that R2f˜1L˜∗∗2 > 0. We can now use
the same argument as in the unilateral commitment case to assert that, for
a given level of output, more management will be used relative to the cost
minimising bundle for that level of output.
3.8 Cobb-Douglas example
We now assume a specific functional form which satisfies the assump-
tions discussed earlier. Consider quadratic revenue functions: R(x, x˜) =
(Z − x− x˜)x and R˜(x˜, x) = (Z − x− x˜)x. Also suppose that the firms’
production functions are Cobb-Douglas: x = MαL1−α and x˜ = M˜αL˜1−α.
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To simplify computations, we assume that Z = 1 and α = 1
2
. Therefore,






























L˜− wL˜− rM˜ (3.15)
3.8.1 Simultaneous-move benchmark








































































− r = 0 (3.19)
To see to whether these equations would yield a maximum or minimum,
we need to check the second-order conditions. The second-order deriva-
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Symmetric expressions can be derived for firmB. It can be shown that, for
sufficiently small values of M and L, these derivatives will be negative10.
Therefore, the solutions to the first-order conditions will maximise profits.
Furthermore, we assign the following numerical values to factor prices:
w = 0.1 and r = 0.2. The Nash equilibrium inputs and output levels are
M = M˜ = 0.1690355937 (3.22)
L = L˜ = 0.3380711875 (3.23)
x = x˜ = 0.2390524292 (3.24)
3.8.2 Bilateral commitment game
Next we analyse the bilateral commitment game with payoff functions as
specified by (3.14). We solve this game using backward induction. That
is, we first compute the Nash equilibrium of the stage-two game, while
taking management levels as given. Differentiating stage-two profits with












































− w = 0 (3.26)
Solving these first-order conditions simultaneously gives us the equilib-







3MM˜ + 4 M˜w + 4Mw + 4w2
)2 (3.27)
10These small values make sense, as the value has to be small in order to have positive
profits
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L˜∗∗(M˜,M) =
M˜ (M + 2w)2(
3MM˜ + 4 M˜w + 4Mw + 4w2
)2 (3.28)
We substitute these functions to obtain stage-one profits. Setting w = 0.1
and r = 0.2 gives us:
pii =
(
1− Mi (Mj + 0.2) +Mj (Mi + 0.2)
3MiMj + 0.4Mj + 0.4Mi + 0.04
)
Mi (Mj + 0.2)
(3MiMj + 0.4Mj + 0.4Mi + 0.04)
− 0.2Mi − 0.1 Mi (Mj + 0.2)
2
(3MiMj + 0.4Mj + 0.4Mi + 0.04)
2
(3.29)
In appendix A, we take the first-order conditions and solve them for M∗∗
and M˜∗∗ to get
M∗∗ = M˜∗∗ = 0.1965087033. (3.30)
Substituting M∗∗ and M˜∗∗ in the stage-two choices of worker inputs yields
L∗∗ = L˜∗∗ = 0.3152454277. (3.31)
These correspond to the following output levels:
x∗∗ = x˜∗∗ = 0.2488944962. (3.32)
Comparing the bilateral commitment game to the simultaneous-move bench-
mark, we can see that commitment leads to an increase in the firms’ equi-
librium output levels. This result is driven by the strategic substitutability
of output levels, which is transferred to input choices. Also, note that equi-
librium management levels are higher in the sequential-move game. This
makes intuitive sense, as management is being used to commit firms to
producing more output. Finally, we see that the worker input is lower.
Thus, strategic commitment is partially undone by the substitutability be-
tween the labour inputs.
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Over-management
Now we investigate whether this numerical example exhibits over-management.
Earlier we defined over-management as an occurrence where more than
the cost-minimising amount of management is used to create the equilib-
rium output. Now we check whether the choice of inputs is cost minimis-
ing for the level of output that the firms produce.
Our sequential-move game yields x∗∗ = 0.2488944962. Assuming a pro-




L and input prices w = 0.1 and r = 0.2, this
output level can be produced at the least cost when Mi ≈ 0.172. This is
lower than the subgame-perfect level of management we obtained in the
sequential-move game.
3.8.3 General Input Prices
The above graph illustrates the worker management ratio in both the static
and sequential move games for a range of managerial wage rates (holding
the workers wage rate at w = 50). Across the entire range the worker to
management ratio is lower in the sequential move game than it is in the
static game. This indicates that production is always more management
intensive than in the absence of a strategic motive.
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3.9 Comparison to Literature
The argument used in this thesis is common in the literature on strategic
commitment. A similar model was studied by Brander & Spencer (1983).
In their paper, firms use R&D as an instrument of strategic commitment.
Their model has two important features.
1) Brander & Spencer (1983) do not assume a production function that
includes the strategic variable. They work directly with “inputs”. This is
justified by the assumption that their input is also an output.
2) In order to have one of their inputs as output, Brander & Spencer (1983)
require that R&D enters the cost function but not the revenue function. As
a result, the only role of investment in R&D is to reduce costs.
Our setting differs in that firms use two inputs, and thus both inputs enter
the revenue function.
3.10 Conclusion
The choice of inputs is essential for any firm. Labour is of special interest
to us because of its specificities, and the fact that all production processes
require the use of labour. The two-stage model analysed above studied
important interactions between different labour types within a firm. How-
ever, this model is not fully satisfactory, because we had to make strong
assumptions about the nature of inputs, the production process and the
market. The next chapter discusses these limitations.
Chapter 4
Weakening the assumptions of
model one
The two-stage model of chapter 3 illustrated the possibility that manage-
ment could be used for strategic commitment. However, the result relied
on a number of unsatisfactory assumptions, namely:
• the horizon of the game;
• the magnitude of management and worker irreversibility;
• the magnitude of management and worker observability.
4.1 Extending the horizon of the game
The two-stage game assumes that firms only compete once. Hypotheti-
cally, the results of the two-stage game will hold over any finite horizon
as long as the managerial input is fixed. In the original example of de-
partment stores, it was stated that the managerial input could be fixed for
up to a month, while in the scope of a week the worker input is flexible.
Thus, the two-stage game would be an accurate representation of reality
only if the firm operates for a month. However, department stores usually
operate over a much longer time span, and, more importantly, they aim to
operate well into the future. Since their objective is to maximise lifetime
54
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profit, the horizon of the two-stage model is highly unrealistic. There-
fore, we need to investigate whether we can broaden our description of
the managerial input and the objective of the firm, while maintaining the
result of over-management.
One way to extend our results to a longer horizon is by having the two-
stage game played repeatedly over time. In this repeated game, the man-
agerial input would be set in a completely flexible fashion at certain dis-
crete points in time. Once it has been determined, it is completely irre-
versible until the next readjustment. Output is produced and sold at other
points in time, after the managerial input is set.
This description of the choice of managerial input is still unrealistic. Man-
agement is never either entirely flexible or entirely unadjustable. There are
no such discrete periods where it is costless to change the managerial in-
put and other periods where it is impossible to change it. Thus, we would
prefer a method that more accurately describes the actual costs associated
with adjustment of management.
There is another problem with repeating the two-period game an infi-
nite number of times. In particular, players may use trigger strategies.
Such strategies may enable firms to collude, and so our result of over-
management will unravel. Moreover, trigger strategies give rise to many
other subgame-perfect equilibria. A favourable solution to our descrip-
tive problem will be one that offers a reasonable way of side-stepping the
multiplicity of equilibria arising from the use of trigger strategies.
4.1.1 Interpretation of the infinite horizon game
Previously we argued that a two-stage game would provide a good start-
ing point for illustrating over-management. Now that the phenomenon
has been analysed in a two-stage framework, it is important to see if the
results can be extended to a more realistic time horizon. We could use two
modeling approaches, a finite horizon and infinite horizon.
A finite horizon game has a pre-determined endpoint. By stating that the
game has a finite horizon, we assume that players know both that the
game will finish, and when the game will finish.
An infinite horizon game does not have a defined endpoint. There are two
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ways to view what this implies about the game: the firms may believe the
game will go on forever or the firms may not know when the game will
end.
Assuming that the owners of a firm believe the game would last forever is
unrealistic. All interactions have an endpoint, and agents likely realise that
the game will eventually come to an end. The second way of interpreting
an infinite horizon makes more intuitive sense. If the firm believes that
competition will end at some point, but does not know the exact time of
this event, they will assign a positive probability to the firm operating at
any point in the future.
This view of the finite horizon game may not suit the decisions of a small
owner-operated firm, where the owner aims to retire in a certain year and
remove himself from his business.1 However, in the case of a large de-
partment store, the owners are in fact a group of shareholders. These
shareholders delegate authority to a board of directors, who in turn are
interested in profit maximisation.2 In this case, there is no reason to expect
that the board of directors or shareholders will wind down operations at a
set point in time.
The idea that a firm competing in a finite but uncertain number of periods
maximises an objective function equivalent to that of an infinitely-lived
firm is supported by the methodological discussion of (Rubinstein 1991).
Rubinstein claims that infinite horizon games are a good predictor of play-
ers’ behaviour when the end point of a game is unknown.
Why are an infinite horizon game and a finite horizon game with an un-
known endpoint conceptually equivalent? First, consider the infinite hori-
zon game. In that setting, the firm wishes to maximises their lifetime
profit, which is the sum of the discounted profits realised throughout time.
Since there is an infinite number of periods, lifetime profit is given by an
infinite sum. Let pit denote the instantaneous profit realised at time t. From





1Such a firm is more likely to be part of a monopolistically competitive retail industry
2The true incentives of a board of directors is not the subject of this thesis
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Here δ is the firm’s discount factor. It reflects the fact that firms do not
value a dollars profit tomorrow as much as they do a dollars profit today3.
When a firm knows they play a finite horizon game, the sum will be over
a finite number of instantaneous profits. If the final period is unknown,
players cannot act in a way that is consistent with a regular finite horizon
game. Suppose that there is a constant probability p that the game will
end in the next round, and thereafter firms will stop receiving profits. If
the game carries on to period t+ 1, they anticipate a profit of pit+1 (Fischer
1989). Assuming a common discount factor δ, the expected lifetime profit





Here the probability of the firm shutting down scales down the same in-
finite sum that the firm would have received if it was playing an infinite
horizon game. The effective discount factor is now δp.
Therefore, a finite horizon game with an unknown end point can be mod-
eled as an infinite horizon game, where the discount factor incorporates
the probability that the game will end in the subsequent period. So the
choice between finite horizon and infinite horizon models will depend on
whether we believe that competition has a well-defined, known endpoint.
Returning to the example of department stores, it seems reasonable to
assume that competition occurs without knowledge of a fixed end date.
Consequently, using an infinite horizon model seems appropriate for our
purpose.
4.1.2 Infinite horizon model
Next we specify the elements of the infinite horizon model, including in-
formation, payoffs and strategies. The aim is to generalise the two-stage
setting, while preserving the results from the previous chapter. The two-
stage model captured the intuition of over-management. However, to
3This can be justified in a number of ways, firstly the missed interest earnings on
the dollar, secondly, the lost buying power from inflation and thirdly, a bias for present
consumption
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broaden the applicability of our results, it is important to extend the do-
main of models that support these results.
The first step in extending the two-stage model is to investigate whether it
fits in an infinite horizon framework. This will facilitate the generalisation
of our results.
Potentially we could have an infinite horizon model in which firms re-
peatedly play the two-stage game from the previous chapter. This has
the advantage of including the two-stage result as a special case when
the discount factor is equal to zero. However, this approach was already
dismissed as descriptively unrealistic, since management is usually not
adjustable costlessly in pre-determined periods.
A more plausible way of extending our model to an infinite horizon would
require taking a step backward and looking at the set of the underlying
main assumptions. These assumptions were:
• irreversibility;
• observability by other firms; and
• ability to shift the output reaction function with the irreversible/observable
choice variable.
Beyond standard economic assumptions, these were the conditions that
we imposed in the previous chapter. To set up the two-stage model, we as-
sumed specific definitions of irreversibility, observability and output com-
mitment. Applying them to the managerial input gave us the result of
over-management. These conditions are stronger than what is required
for over-management to occur. They could be weakened without destroy-
ing our fundamental result of over-management.
On irreversibility
Previously the managerial input was deemed to be irreversible because the
firm could not change it within the given time frame. This irreversibility
implied that management was also observable, and it had commitment
value as long as it generated higher equilibrium output and reduced the
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equilibrium output of other firms. We need to modify these ideas in the
context of an infinite horizon setting.
An input is never fully irreversible. In the case of the managerial input, it
is always possible to decrease it by paying a large enough (but finite) sum
of money to remove a manager. It is also possible to increase this input by
paying a large sum of money to attract a talented new manager. Therefore,
the managerial input can be changed, but it may be costly to do so.
In the previous model, it was impossible to adjust the managerial input.
This is equivalent to assuming that the cost of changing the level of man-
agement was infinite. With infinite costs, it would never be optimal to
change the level of management as the benefit of doing so is finite. As a
result, the managerial input can be treated as fixed.
In chapter 2, the cost of changing an input over time was termed “adjust-
ment cost”. We claimed that the managerial input has a relatively high
adjustment cost. This was justified by the difficulty of changing the man-
agerial input at both the extensive and intensive margins. In the two-stage
model, the extreme assumption of infinite adjustment cost (irreversible
management) was made to simplify the analysis. In an infinite-horizon
setting, this assumption is descriptively unrealistic, and so the idea of a
finite adjustment cost will now be used.
Perfect irreversibility is equivalent to having an infinite adjustment cost,
and a perfectly reversible input has an adjustment cost of zero. When the
managerial input has a positive but finite adjustment cost, it is partially
irreversible. The higher the adjustment cost, the less reversible the input
becomes.
The idea of an adjustment cost instead of complete irreversibility has been
used previously in the strategic investment literature. For commitment
using capacity stocks see (Reynolds 1987).
On observability
Observability refers to the information available to the firms at the time
they make their input/output decisions.
In the previous model, the fixed nature of the managerial input was enough
to ensure its observability. An infinite horizon model gives us the oppor-
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tunity to modify and generalise this idea. When the firm makes their choice
of managerial and worker inputs, it is unlikely that its opponents would
be able to observe the current choice of worker and/or managerial input.
However, firms may be able to observe lagged values of their opponents’
inputs. The observability of lagged input choices may come from indus-
trial spying, or publicly released information.
Thus, in the next chapter observability will refer to the knowledge of the
lagged values of the managerial and worker inputs. These lagged values
will be payoff relevant only when inputs are costly to adjust. This implies
that (partial) irreversibility and observability are closely interrelated.
On the relationship between management, workers, and output.
Given our new notions of irreversibility and observability, the final nec-
essary ingredient is that management shifts the output reaction function.
In the previous model, we required that the firm’s managerial input and
the opponent’s worker inputs are strategic substitutes. Then a firm can in-
crease its profit by committing to a higher level of output. This condition
is still essential. If the managerial input cannot lead to a higher level of
output, then it is not going to be used as a strategic resource.
Chapter 5
Model Two
The two-stage game analysed in the previous chapter involved three strong
assumptions:
1. The managerial input is infinitely costly to adjust.
2. The worker input is costless to adjust.
3. The game ends after the second period.
The aim of this chapter is to show that the result of over-management
continues to hold when these assumptions are relaxed. We will investigate
the role of the adjustment cost and timing of management for inducing
over-management. We illustrate that, in a two stage model, a finite cost of
adjusting the managerial input is sufficient to deliver over-management.
5.1 Finite adjustment costs of management
5.1.1 Discussion
In real life, adjusting management is not costless. However, such adjust-
ments are not infinitely costly as assumed in the previous model. Firms’
management levels do change over time. In large companies, managers
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can be moved between firm divisions, or even promoted to a different
role. Sometimes they can even be removed. This suggests that the cost of
changing the managerial input is finite.
Nevertheless, this cost is non-negligible. The process of adjusting man-
agement is slow: adding managers involves long hiring procedures and
training. Often firms reduce their managerial input by waiting for man-
agers to leave and then not replacing them, rather than by directly remov-
ing managers from their positions. This adjustment is usually slower than
the underlying changes in the marketplace. Consumer demand is fickle:
it is heavily influenced by consumer expectations and the general state
of the economy. A sudden fall in consumer confidence can lead to a big
change in sales, but firms rarely respond with a matching adjustment of
management.
Finite but non-negligible adjustment costs of the managerial input have
important implications for the firm’s choice of management. If manage-
ment levels can be changed while the firm is choosing its output, then
they cannot deliver full commitment. Nevertheless, sufficiently high ad-
justment costs ensure partial irreversibility. The cost to changing man-
agement will be weighed against the subsequent strategic benefits arising
from this change. If a player chooses a higher level of management today,
he will have a disincentive to reduce his management in the future. In this
way, firms can partially commit to higher output.
The plausibility of the modeling approach adopted in this chapter makes it
more appealing than the previous notion of irreversibility. We will demon-
strate that this weaker notion still allows us to explain the existence of
over-management.
In this example we will keep any adjustment cost of the worker input im-
plicitly equal to zero. In appendix E we also derive the Euler equations
for a four state model in which the worker input does have a positive ad-
justment cost. However, we believe that this adjustment cost is not very
high, and therefore the worker input is not observable or particularly irre-
versible.
5.1.2 Summary argument
The argument is as follows:
CHAPTER 5. MODEL TWO 63
1. the management input influences the marginal productivity of other
inputs;
2. management is costly to change over time;
3. previous management levels are observable. Therefore,
4. management has commitment value.
The purpose of our model is to illustrate the logical link between premises
1,2 & 3 and our conclusion 4.
5.2 Notation
Our notation is similar to Coury & Petkov (2007). Consider a function f
that has n arguments. A subscript i denotes the partial derivative of that
function with respect to the i-th argument. For example, f2(a, b) is used
to denote the partial derivative ∂f(a, b)/∂b. Superscripts are reserved for
time.
5.2.1 Choice variables
Suppose that two players, firms A and B, compete in an infinite-horizon
quantity game. At time t each firm produces its output from two labour
inputs, workers and managers. The period-t worker inputs of A and B are
denoted by Lt and L˜t, respectively. The period-t managerial inputs of A
and B are denoted by M t and M˜ t, respectively.
5.3 Infinite horizon model
5.3.1 Setup
We assume that any change in management between successive periods
gives rise to an adjustment cost. These costs link the firms’ profits at time
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t to the management levels at time t − 1. Because of this link the past his-
tory of this dynamical system can be summarised by the previous levels
of management. In other words, M t−1 and M˜ t−1 constitute period-t state
variables. Importantly, these variables are payoff-relevant, as in the mini-
mum state variable literature of McCallum (1999)).
In contrast, adjusting the worker input over time does not incur any costs.
This implies that lagged worker input is not payoff relevant and therefore
not a state variable. Lt−1 and L˜t−1 may give the firm some information
about the rationality of its opponent. Our underlying assumption is that
all agents are rational. Given that rationality is common knowledge, the
value of the worker input in period t−1 does not provide any information
about the value of inputs in period t.
Payoffs
The instantaneous payoff function describes a firm’s profit at time t as a
function of their choice of inputs, the competitor’s choice of inputs and the
state variables. In our model, the instantaneous payoff functions of a firms
A andB are defined as pi(Lt,M t, L˜t, M˜ t,M t−1, M˜ t−1) and p˜i(L˜t, M˜ t, Lt,M t, M˜ t−1,M t−1),
respectively.
As the firms are competing over an infinite horizon, at a given point in




δtpi(Lt,M t, L˜t, M˜ t,M t−1, M˜ t−1), Π˜ =
∞∑
t=0
δtp˜i(L˜t, M˜ t, Lt,M t, M˜ t−1,M t−1).
(5.1)
Here δ ∈ (0, 1) is a common discount factor. We will refer to Π and Π˜
lifetime profits.
Solution concept
When modeling over-management, the appropriate solution concept is
that of a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). It accounts for the use of man-
agement as an instrument of strategic commitment. Moreover, it helps us
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avoid the multiplicity of equilibria associated with trigger strategies. This
solution concept assumes that the players’ strategies are time-invariant
functions of the payoff relevant states:
M t = f(M t−1, M˜ t−1), M˜ t = f˜( ˜M t−1,M t−1)
Lt = g(M t−1, M˜ t−1), L˜t = g˜(M˜ t−1,M t−1).
Note that any MPE is also subgame perfect: the strategies will be optimal
regardless of past history.
5.3.2 Analysis
Recursive formulation
To characterise the MPE of this game, we first need to formulate the prob-
lem recursively. Recursive formulation is attained with the help of Bell-
man equations, which define a relationship between the value of the game
in two successive periods. Let V and V˜ be the players’ value functions:
they define the equilibrium lifetime payoff of the firms as functions of the
current state variables. As already discussed, the state variables of this
model are the previous period’s management levels.
The agents are assumed to have rational expectations: they correctly an-
ticipate the behaviour of their opponent. Given our conjectures about the
equilibrium strategies, the Bellman equations of firms A and B take the
form:
V (M t−1, M˜ t−1) = max
Lt,Mt
{pi(Lt,M t, g˜(M˜ t−1,M t−1), f˜(M˜ t−1,M t−1),M t−1, M˜ t−1)
+ δV (M t, f˜(M˜ t−1,M t−1))}
(5.2)
and
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V˜ (M˜ t−1,M t−1) = max
L˜t,M˜t
{p˜i(L˜t, M˜ t, g(M t−1, M˜ t−1), f(M t−1, M˜ t−1), M˜ t−1,M t−1)
+ δV˜ (M˜ t, f(M t−1, M˜ t−1))}.
(5.3)
Moreover, our conjectures must be consistent with profit maximisation
and rational expectations. Therefore, firm A’s strategies must satisfy:
g(M t−1, M˜ t−1) = arg max
Lt
{pi(Lt, f(M t−1, M˜ t−1), g˜(M˜ t−1,M t−1), f˜(M˜ t−1,M t−1),M t−1, M˜ t−1)
+ δV (f(M t−1, M˜ t−1), f˜( ˜M t−1,M t−1))}
(5.4)
and
f(M t−1, M˜ t−1) = arg max
Mt
{pi(g(M t−1, M˜ t−1),M t, g˜(M˜ t−1,M t−1), f˜(M˜ t−1,M t−1),M t−1, M˜ t−1)
+ δV (M t, f˜( ˜M t−1,M t−1))}.
(5.5)
Firm B’s strategies must satisfy analogous conditions.
The recursive relationship defined by the Bellman equations can be used to
study the problem of choosing inputs. An increase in managementM t will
have several effects on the lifetime profit of firm A. The first effect would
be a change in its period t instantaneous profit pi(Lt,M t, L˜t, M˜ t,M t−1, M˜ t−1).
In the subsequent period, there will be an effect on firm A’s adjustment
costs, as well as a strategic effect, as firm B will change its behaviour as
a result of A’s deviation. These future effects are captured through A’s
continuation value function V (M t, f˜ t( ˜M t−1,M t−1)).
If the payoff consequences of this action go in different directions in period
t and t + 1, firm A will face an intertemporal trade-off. We will show that
this trade-off parallels the trade-off arising in the two-stage game. The pre-
vious chapter demonstrated that firms competing in strategic substitutes
can use management as an instrument of strategic commitment to gain a
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first-mover advantage. In the infinite horizon setting, players have similar
incentives. As long as a higher level of management can commit the firms
to higher output, then equilibrium management will be set at higher levels
than in the static game.
Deriving the equilibrium conditions
Firm A’s choices must satisfy two first order conditions: one that defines
optimal worker input at time t, and one that defines optimal managerial
input at time t. These are both obtained by differentiating the right-hand
side of firm A’s Bellman equation with respect to the relevant choice vari-
ables.
The first order condition for workers is pit1 = 0. It states that the worker
input is chosen so that its current marginal revenue product is equal to the
current marginal cost of this input. This condition is identical to the one
derived in the standard static game.




1 = 0. (5.6)
It states that the optimal choice of management at time t depends on how
it influences A’s current profit, and how it affects A’s continuation payoff
as a state variable. If the value function is increasing in the firm’s lagged
management, then the firm has an incentive to hire more managers than
in the static game (for a given level of output). Thus, as long as V t+11 > 0
our result of over-management will hold.1
Next we consider a marginal change in the state variables.2 Lagged man-
agement levelsM t−1, ˜M t−1 have a direct effect on the players’ payoffs, and
also an indirect effect through the their choice variables. However, profit
maximisation allows us to appeal to the envelope theorem. Thus, we can
focus only on the direct effect of the state on the payoffs. Differentiating
1By the mean-value theorem (Brander & Spencer 1983)
2Note this is equivalent to looking at how the previous levels of management influ-
ence the firms current choice of inputs
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the Bellman equations with respect to the state variables on the optimal
path gives us the players’ envelope conditions






























Since the value functions are time invariant, we can combine the two first
order conditions and the two envelope conditions to derive the Euler equa-
tion for firm A’s problem. Substituting out the derivatives of V and mov-
ing forward by 2 periods gives us:
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The Euler equation can be decomposed into the following elements.
• The term [pit2 + δ(pit+13 g˜t+12 + pit+15 )] captures the direct payoff effect
and the effect through worker adjustment of a marginal deviation
















as a result of B’s subsequent adjustment of management.
• The term
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the payoff effect that occurs as A readjust its management in expec-
tation of B’s reaction.
Managerial input is optimally chosen optimally when these three marginal
payoff effects sum up to zero. This implies that a rational player has no
incentive to deviate from its strategy.
Fundamentally, the Euler equation suggests that the required assumption
for over-management is that managers is strategic substitutability. This is
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the same result Jun & Vives (2004) found for capital, and it can be gener-
alised for any game with some type of Stakelberg leadership potential (Jun
& Vives 2001).
5.4 Motivation for the numerical example
When solving infinite horizon games it is common to adopt production
functions, inverse demand functions and costs that yield linear-quadratic
instantaneous payoffs. The reason is that in linear-quadratic problems we
know that there will be an equilibrium involving strategies that are linear
in the state variables. This simplifies numerical computations.
One way to set up our problem as linear quadratic is to assume a linear
inverse demand function, a linear production function, and linear input
costs. This implies that the firm’s revenue function is quadratic, and thus
profits will be quadratic in inputs. However, this formulation does not
yield over-management.
Generally, in the two-stage model we could sign L˜2 given the sign of
R1(f1,1f2 − f1,2f1). When our production function is linear, both f1,1 and
f1,2 are equal to zero. As a result, L˜2 = 0 and the firm does not deviate
from the cost minimising bundle.
We can also illustrate this through the following two-stage example.
5.4.1 Two-period example with perfect substitutability
Suppose that we have a production function which is linear in the two
labour inputs, workers (L) and managers (M). Thus, it takes the form
x = µL + ηM , where µ is the marginal product of workers and η is the
marginal product of management. For simplicity we will set η = µ = 1.
However, input prices are asymmetric. In this example, the marginal cost
of a worker is w = 1 while the marginal cost of a manager is r = 2.
The revenue function of firm A is quadratic and takes the form R = (Z −
(L + M)− (L˜ + M˜))(L + M). We will set Z = 101. Given our cost specifi-
cation, the firm’s profit function will be linear-quadratic:
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pi = (101− (L+M)− (L˜+ M˜))(L+M)− L− 2M (5.9)
Firm B’s profit function is symmetric:
p˜i = ((101− (L˜+ M˜)− (L+M))(L˜+ M˜)− L˜− 2M˜ (5.10)
Simultaneous-move benchmark
In the simultaneous-move game, the first order conditions are:
dpi
dL
= 100− (2L+ 2M)− (L˜+ M˜) = 0 (5.11)
dpi
dM
= 99− (2L+ 2M)− (L˜+ M˜) = 0 (5.12)
dp˜i
dL˜
= 100− (2L˜+ 2M˜)− (L+M)− = 0 (5.13)
dp˜i
dM˜
= 99− (2L˜+ 2M˜)− (L+M) = 0 (5.14)
In this static game, we have a corner solution: in equilibrium M and M˜
will be set equal to zero. This is driven by the fact that both inputs have
identical marginal products, but the marginal cost of the managerial input
is higher than that of the worker input. Therefore, we can set the manage-
rial inputs equal to zero and solve for the two firms’ equilibrium worker








The equilibrium profit of each firm is 1111.11.
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When one firm commits
Next we consider the case when firm A commits by choosing a positive
level of management M > 0, while firm B still sets M˜ = 0. Solving for L




−M, L˜ = 100
3
(5.16)
In this case, the commitment power of management stems from the re-
quirement that L must be greater than or equal to zero. Treating M as a
parameter, we can see that as long as M < 100/3 the choice of L will be
positive and the choice of L˜ will remain at 100
3
. However, if M > 100
3
the
equilibrium outcome will violate the above first order conditions. There-
fore, L˜ = 100
3
will not be a best response as L cannot be negative. Ef-
fectively, the non-negativity constraint on L makes the output associated
with management irreversible when M > 100/3.
To show the commitment power of M in this game, we set L = 0 as well
as M˜ = 0 and then study the choice of M . If the equilibrium value of
M exceeds 100
3
then we need to compare two corner solutions: one where
M = 0 and one where L = 0. This will allow us to determine the choice of
firm Ain the first stage of the game.
We apply backward induction while conjecturing that L = 0 and M˜ = 0.
Firm B’s profit function takes the form:
p˜i = (101− L˜−M)L˜− L˜.
The corresponding first-order condition is:
dp˜i
dL˜
= 100− 2L˜−M = 0.





Firm A realizes that their choice of managerial input will affect Firm B’s
worker input, and thereby output. In particular, for every unit of manage-
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rial input M used, Firm B will reduce their worker input by 1/2. Firm A
will takes this into account. Its stage-1 profit function will have the follow-
ing form:
pi = (101−M − 100−M
2
)M − 2M
Its first-order condition is given by:
dpi
dM
= 49−M = 0.
Therefore, the profit maximising level of A’s management would be M =
49.
To figure out whether firm A will choose to commit by setting M = 49, we
need to compare its profit to the case when M = 0. Earlier we found that
when its managerial input is 0, A’s equilibrium profit is pi = 1111.11. If,
however, firm A chooses M = 49, its equilibrium payoff is pi = 1200.5.
Thus, the equilibrium of the unilateral commitment game will involve
over-management. The corresponding equilibrium profit of firm B is p˜i =
599.25.
When both firms commit
Now suppose that both firms can choose their management levels up-
front. Again, for the managerial input to play a commitment role, firms
have to choose management levels above 100/3.
When analyzing this game, we start by looking at the case where the
worker non-negativity constraint is binding: L = L˜ = 0. Thus, the profit
function of firm A will be given by:
pi = (101−M − M˜)M − 2M
It implies the following first-order condition:
dpi
dM
= 99− 2M − M˜ = 0
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Given symmetry, in equilibrium we obtain M = 33, M˜ = 33.
However, when M = 33, M˜ = 33, setting L = 0 is not a best response.
Therefore, this equilibrium is not subgame perfect. When both firms are
choosing management up-front, the game becomes equivalent to the static
benchmark: in the subgame perfect equilibrium, both firms set M = M˜ =
0 and L = L˜ = 100/3, thus producing 100/3 units of output.
5.4.2 Two-period example with quadratic costs
Justification for quadratic costs
In microeconomics we typically assume that the cost of labour inputs is
linear. Generally, staff is paid per hour or day, rather than as some non-
linear function of work time. However, maintaining this assumptions
would create technical difficulties in an infinite horizon framework. The
reason is that the linear production functions imply perfect substitutabil-
ity of inputs. Thus, linear input costs would necessarily lead to corner
solutions as demonstrated in the previous example.
To resolve this issue, we will assume quadratic input costs. This assump-
tion can be justified in two ways: introduce imperfect competition in the
input markets, or argue that this is a ”transformed” problem based on un-
derlying non-linear production functions..
The first approach is tempting, given that it involves the plausible assump-
tion that firms have market power in the labour market. However, over-
management stemming from monopsony power does not appear to be di-
rectly comparable to our two-stage model in chapter three, as it assumes
assumed perfect competition in the factor markets. Therefore, we will take
the second approach.





2 . Suppose that production costs are linear in the factor inputs:
C(xt) = wlt+rmt. Furthermore, assume that there is a cost of adjusting the





2 − (mt−1) 12
)2
.
Using a tilde to denote firm B’s variables, firm A’s instantaneous payoff at
time t is:
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pit = (Z − ((lt) 12 + (mt) 12 )− ((l˜t) 12 + (m˜t) 12 ))((lt) 12 + (mt) 12 )





2 − (mt−1) 12
)2
This game does not fit within a linear-quadratic framework. But if we use
transformed variables Lt = (lt)2 and M t = (mt)2 the profit function takes
a familiar form:
pit = (Z − (Lt +M t)− (L˜t + M˜ t)(Lt +M t)
− w(Lt)2 − r(M t)2 − ψ
2
(
M t −M t−1)2
Two-period setup
Suppose that firm A and firm B produce in two periods. The demand
function of both firms is linear. It generates revenue functions Rt = (Z −
xt − x˜t)xt and R˜t = (Z − xt − x˜t)x˜t, respectively. The production func-
tions are linear in managerial and worker inputs: xt = µLt + ηM t and
x˜t = µL˜t + ηM˜ t. Furthermore, we assume that, in period 2, players also
incur adjustment costs ψ
2
(M2 −M1)2 and ψ
2
(M˜2 − M˜1)2. The presence of
adjustment costs implies that the choice of period-1 managerial input will
affect profits in both periods. In order to ensure that we have an interior
solution, the input cost of firm A will be quadratic as discussed above:
C(x(Lt,M t)) = w(Lt)2 + r(M t)2
As a result Firm A’s profit function at time t ∈ {1, 2} takes the form:
pit(Lt,M t, L˜t, M˜ t,M t−1) = (Z − (µLt + ηM t)− (µL˜t + ηM˜ t))(µLt + ηM t)
− w(Lt)2 − r(M t)2 − ψ
t
2
(M t −M t−1)2,
(5.18)
where ψ1 = 0, ψ2 = ψ. The profit function of firm B is symmetric. In pe-
riod 1, the two firms choose their inputs to maximise their lifetime profits,
pi1 + δpi2 and p˜i1 + δp˜i2, respectively, where δ is a common discount factor.
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In period 2, the firms’ objective is to maximise the stage-2 profits pi2 and
p˜i2.
Characterising the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
We solve this game by backward induction. In the second stage, the firms
will choose L2,M2, L˜2, M˜2 in order to maximise their period-2 profits. The
stage-two payoff function of firm A is given by:
pi2(L2,M2, L˜2, M˜2,M1) = (Z − (µL2 + ηM2)− (µL˜2 + ηM˜2))(µL2 + ηM2)




The payoff function of firm B is given by a symmetric expression.
The optimal choice of each player is characterised by the following first
order conditions:
pi21 = Z − 2(L2 +M2)− (L˜2 + M˜2)− 2wL2 = 0
pi22 = Z − 2(L2 +M2)− (L˜2 + M˜2)− 2rM2 − ψ(M2 −M1) = 0
p˜i21 = Z − 2(L˜2 + M˜2)− (L2 +M2)− 2wL˜2 = 0
p˜i22 = Z − 2(L˜2 + M˜2)− (L2 +M2)− 2rM˜2 − ψ(M˜2 − M˜1) = 0
Solving these conditions delivers the period-two input choicesL2,M2, L˜2, M˜2
as functions ofM1 and M˜1. Let these functions be denoted by byL2(M1, M˜1),
M2(M1, M˜1), L˜2(M˜1,M1), and M˜2(M˜1,M1).
In period 1, the two firms choose L1,M1, L˜1, M˜1 to maximise their dis-
counted lifetime profits while taking into account potential strategic con-
sequences in period 2. That is, their objective functions will be equal to
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the instantaneous payoffs associated with their choice of management at
time 1 and the continuation payoff, which is the payoff at time 2. Firm A’s
period-1 objective is thus given by
pi1(L1,M1, L˜1, M˜1)+δ(pi2(L2(M1, M˜1),M2(M1, M˜1), L˜2(M˜1,M1), M˜2(M˜1,M1)))
Taking the first order conditions, we can solve for the (symmetric) equilib-
rium choices of worker and managerial inputs of the two firms.
Numerical results
To solve this game numerically, we assume the following parameters:
Z = 100w = 1r = 1ψ = 10
The above game yields the a subgame-perfect equilibrium where.
L1 = L˜1 = 12.21
M1 = M˜1 = 12.97
L2 = L˜2 = 12.29
M2 = M˜2 = 12.86
In this example managers and workers have the same marginal products
and marginal input costs. Therefore, the ”cost minimising bundle” would
involve equal amounts of managerial and worker inputs. In our example,
the equilibrium management-to-worker ratio is greater than one, which
implies over-management. This is driven by the fact that firms use period-
1 management as an instrument of strategic commitment. Given this ob-
servation, we now study an infinite horizon version of this model.
5.5 Infinite horizon linear-quadratic example
Now suppose that the two firms compete over infinitely many periods.
Firm A’s period-t instantaneous profit is given by:
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pit = (Z − (µLt + ηM t)− (µL˜t + ηM˜ t))(µLt + ηM t)
− w(Lt)2 − r(M t)2 − ψ
2
(M t −M t−1)2
(5.20)
The instantaneous profit of firm B is analogous.
The linear-quadratic specification suggests that there is a Markov-perfect
equilibrium involving strategies that are linear functions of the state vari-
ables. We conjecture that these strategies are given by:
M t = f t = α1 + β1M
t−1 + β2 ˜M t−1
M˜ t = f˜t = α˜1 + β˜1M˜
t−1 + β˜2M t−1
Lt = gt = α2 + β3M
t−1 + β4 ˜M t−1
L˜t = g˜t = α˜2 + β˜3M˜
t−1 + β˜4M t−1
Assuming µ = 1 and η = 1, this conjecture implies that the profit of firm A
can be written as
pit =
(
Z − (Lt +M t)− (α˜2 + β˜3M˜ t−1 + β˜4M t−1 + α˜1 + β˜1M˜ t−1 + β˜2M t−1))(
Lt +M t
)− w(Lt)2 − r(M t)2 − ψ
2
(M t −M t−1)2
(5.21)
We have 12 unknown strategy parameters: α1, β1, β2, α2, β3, β4, α˜1, β˜1, β˜2,
α˜2, β˜3, β˜4. We solve for these using the method of undetermined coeffi-
cients.
5.5.1 The impact of the adjustment cost
Once we find the equilibrium strategies, we can compute the steady state
values of inputs and plot them as functions of the adjustment cost parame-
ter ψ. We consider values of ψ that are sufficiently high to guarantee stable
MPE. The remaining parameters are as specified in the table below:







Figure 1 shows the steady state ratio of management to worker inputs:
How M/L changes with the managerial transaction cost ψ
Figure 1
In an equivalent static game with zero adjustment costs, the cost minimis-
ing manager to worker ratio would be equal to 1. Our figure shows that
in the infinite horizon model, the steady state management to worker ra-
tio always exceeds 1. Therefore, the infinite horizon game generates over-
management. Also, note that as the adjustment cost rises, the commitment
value of the managerial input increases. Thus, the steady state manage-
ment to worker ratio is increasing in ψ.
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5.5.2 The impact of the discount factor
Next we consider the implications of the discount factor for the ratio of
management to worker inputs. Intuitively, the larger the discount factor
is, the more the agent values future payoffs relative to current payoffs.
This makes commitment to future output more valuable. Therefore, we
would expect the ratio of management to worker inputs to be increasing
in δ.
We consider discount factors between 0.35 and 1. The value of ψ is set at
10. The remaining parameters are as specified in the table above.
How M/L changes with the discount factor δ
Figure 2
Figure 2 confirms that the steady-state management to worker ratio rises
as the discount factor increases.
5.5.3 The impact of product heterogeneity
One final relationship of interest is the level of substitutability between
products. Intuitively, the more heterogeneous the two products are, the
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less impact the firm’s choice has on the marginal revenue of its opponent.
As a result, the more heterogenous the product, the less scope there is for
commitment.
To model product heterogeneity, we assume that firm A’s inverse demand
in period t is given by:
pt = Z − xt − χx˜t,
where χ ∈ (0, 1). The higher the value of χ, the higher the degree of sub-
stitutability. At χ = 0 the firms are monopolists in their own markets, so
there should be no commitment motive. At χ = 1 the firms are selling
homogenous goods, so we revert to the formulation analysed previously.
We set ψ = 10 and δ = 0.9, while the other parameters are unchanged. The
steady-state management to worker ratio is plotted in the graph below:
How M/L changes with the degree of product heterogeneity χ
Figure 3
As expected, a higher χ leads to a higher management to worker ratio.
Furthermore, when χ = 0 the management to worker ratio is equal to the
cost minimising ratio of 1.
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5.6 Conclusion
The dynamic framework provides a more satisfying view of what causes
over-management in retail firms. By showing that over-management still
occurs when the horizon of the game is extended indefinitely we have
extended the number of situations where our results hold. Furthermore,
fitting the result of over-management into a framework that does not pre-
suppose strict irreversibility or observability of inputs also adds to the de-
gree of realism surrounding our conclusions.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The preceding chapters discussed the strategic investment approach to
explaining over-management. In economics, the cost of labour is often
viewed as a simple variable cost. My thesis argues that this is not always
the case. Some categories of labour inputs could be costly and difficult to
adjust. As a result of costly adjustment, firms’ choices of labour inputs in-
volve more than a decision on what bundle of labour types is required to
minimise costs. In particular, there could be a strategic motive behind the
decisions to hire skilled and unskilled labour.
The two models presented here offer a testable hypothesis about strategic
commitment. This enables us to verify whether over-management holds
up in reality. Some potential ways of testing the hypothesis of retail over-
management are described in Appendix C.
The labour input is difficult to study, since its productivity directly de-
pends on interaction between agents. However, the distinction between
skilled and unskilled labour goes some way in explaining the labour poli-
cies of oligopolistic firms. At a macro level, these strategic considerations
provide insight into the behaviour of the labour market in an economy
with aggregate shocks.
Fundamentally, we have shown that there is a strategic investment incen-
tive for the hiring of skilled labour. Further research questions that may
be asked along these lines are as follows.
• Empirical testing to see if over-management/commitment does oc-
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cur,
• Numerical work on a non-linear specification of the infinite horizon
model (fundamentally with non-linear strategy functions).
• Exploring the interaction of the labour input with other input types
for the firm (capital and resources).
• Considering imperfect observability and introducing expectations
regarding other firms’ labour inputs.





After substitution of the worker strategies in the stage-1 payoff of firm
i ∈ {A,B}, we obtain the following payoff functions:
pii =
(
1− Mi (Mj + 0.2) +Mj (Mi + 0.2)
3MiMj + 0.4Mj + 0.4Mi + 0.04
)
Mi (Mj + 0.2)
(3MiMj + 0.4Mj + 0.4Mi + 0.04)
− 0.2Mi − 0.1 Mi (Mj + 0.2)
2
(3MiMj + 0.4Mj + 0.4Mi + 0.04)
2 .
(7.1)
Differentiating these with respect to the firm’s management input yields
the first-order conditions
−33125MiMj3 + 337500Mi2Mj3 + 123750Mi2Mj2 + 15000Mi2Mj + 600Mi2
−4250Mj3 + 2000Mi3 + 843750Mi3Mj3 + 337500Mi3Mj2 + 45000Mi3Mj
−22500MiMj2 − 2525Mj2 − 190Mi − 23− 440Mj − 3975MiMj = 0
and
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−2525Mi2 + 2000Mj3 − 4250Mi3 + 843750Mi3Mj3 + 337500Mi3Mj2 − 33125Mi3M
15000MiMj
2 + 600Mj
2 − 440Mi − 190Mj − 3975MiMj − 23 = 0.
This system of equations has nine potential solutions. However, manage-
ment levels have to be positive. Moreover, the solution has to be a real
number. Finally, our game is symmetric, so we know that in equilibrium




j = 0.1965087033. (7.2)
Substituting the equilibrium management levels, we obtain
L∗i = L
∗
j = 0.3152454277. (7.3)
xi = xj = 0.2488944962. (7.4)
7.2 Appendix B
7.2.1 Increasing the number of firms
So far we have assumed a duopolistic industry. We can generalise our
setting to n firms as follows.
Consider an arbitrary firm i, i ∈ (1, n). Its revenue function is now Ri =
Ri(f 1, f 2, ..., fn). Firm i’s payoff function takes the form
pii = Ri − wLi − rM i. (7.5)








− w = 0. (7.6)
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− r = 0. (7.7)
In the sequential game, the first-order conditions for the subgame-perfect



























−r = 0. (7.8)
Taking into account that the worker input is chosen optimally, these first-

















− r = 0. (7.9)
This indicates that the result of over-management still depends on the sign
of ∂Lj/∂M i.
7.3 Appendix C
If a firm’s choice of inputs does not minimise costs, it is possible that this
firm may be using inputs for strategic commitment. This hypothesis is
difficult thing to test for, given the huge variety of possible revenue func-
tions and production functions that firms may face. However, it is pos-
sible to circumvent these problems by way of a non-parametric test for
cost-minimisation.
This approach was first suggested by Hanoch & Rothschild (1972) and
Varian (1984). Simply put, the test looks through the data to see if there at
any point more inputs have been used to create a level of output relative
to prior observed data. Varian calls this the weak axiom of cost minimization.
Ray (2004) noted that this type of test may not be appropriate because of
volatility in the production process. Fundamentally, the transition from
inputs to outputs may involve some error resulting from the difference
between ex-ante expectations and ex-post outcomes. His solution is to
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estimate how large the conceivable error could be to make the data satisfy
the weak axiom of cost minimization. We then have to ask, is this level of
error in the production process believable?
In the case of department stores our final output is actually sales, implying
that a fair level of volatility in the creation of outputs from a given set of
inputs is believable. Therefore, any test would have to take into consider-
ation unpredictable shifts in demand.
7.4 Appendix D
7.4.1 Deriving Firm A’s Euler equation
The Bellman equation of firm A is
V (M t−1, M˜ t−1) = max
Lt,Mt
{pit(Lt,M t, g˜t(M˜ t−1,M t−1), f˜ t( ˜M t−1,M t−1),M t−1, M˜ t−1)
+ δV (M t, f˜ t( ˜M t−1,M t−1))}.
(7.10)
The first-order conditions with respect to Lt and M t are
0 = pit1
0 = pit2 + δV
t+1
1 .
Solving for the derivative of the value function gives us




Since the value function is time invariant, it must be true that
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Differentiation with respect to M t and M t−1 yields the following envelope
conditions

















































We can solve this condition for V t+12 :

















Again, stationarity of the value function implies



























































Finally, we move the time subscript forward by 2 periods, and multiply by
δ2f˜ t+12 to obtain
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7.5.1 Euler equations for the four state model
First-Order Conditions and Envelope Conditions
Firm A’s first-order conditions are:
0 = pit1 + δV
t+1
1
0 = pit2 + δV
t+1
2 .
The envelope condition for Lt−1 is



















The envelope condition for M t−1 is



















The envelope condition for L˜t−1 is

















The envelope condition for M˜ t−1 is
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Given stationarity, we can move around the time index. Lagging equation
2 and rearranging yields




Similarly from equation 3 we get






































































































































4 − g˜t4f˜ t3
. (7.26)
CHAPTER 7. APPENDIX 91
Labour Euler Equation
The labour Euler equation can be derived by substituting equations 7.22
and 7.23 into equation 7.16. In order to remove the value function from





























4 − g˜t−14 f˜ t−13
.
(7.27)






















2. Putting this all together and moving forward two periods in
time gives:



















































We substitute equations 7.22 and 7.23 into equation 7.17. We also need a




























4 − g˜t−14 f˜ t−13
.
(7.29)























2. Putting this all together and moving forward two
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periods in time gives:
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